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30th SPACE WING/VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE

FINAL LAUNCH SITE SAFETY ASSESSMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1.0 WESTERN RANGE GENERAL RANGE CAPABILITIES

1.1	GENERAL INFORMATION.....	1-1
1.1.1	Local Area and Local Population Information	1-1
1.1.2	Western Range History/General Capabilities	1-5
1.1.3	Western Range Organization.....	1-5
1.1.4	Western Range.....	1-7
1.1.5	The Air Force Commercial Program.....	1-10
1.1.5.1	Standard Documentation.....	1-11
1.1.5.2	Establishing the New Commercial Customer.....	1-13
1.1.5.3	Using Excess Capacity of Government Launch Property.....	1-14
1.1.5.4	Summary.....	1-17
1.2	RANGE DESCRIPTION	1-18
1.2.1	Facilities and Instrumentation.....	1-18
1.2.2	Local and Off-Range Instrumentation	1-18
1.2.2.1	Pillar Point.....	1-18
1.2.2.2	Anderson Peak.....	1-20
1.2.2.3	Vandenberg Air Force Base	1-20
1.2.2.4	Santa Ynez Peak.....	1-25
1.2.3	Meteorological Support.....	1-25
1.2.4	Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division , Point Mugu, CA.....	1-27
1.2.5	Hawaiian Islands	1-28
1.2.6	Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site	1-29
1.3	WR COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SUPPORT CAPABILITY	1-32

SECTION 2.0 WESTERN RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM

2.1	INTRODUCTION.....	2-1
2.2	SAFETY ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES.....	2-1
2.2.1	Base Safety.....	2-1
2.2.2	Mission Flight Control	2-4
2.2.3	Systems Safety	2-4
2.2.4	Flight Analysis	2-5
2.2.5	30 SW Supporting Organizations	2-6
2.2.5.1	Commander, 30 Operations Group	2-6
2.2.5.2	Commander, 30 Logistics Group	2-6
2.2.5.3	Commander, 30 Support Group	2-8
2.2.5.4	Commander, 30 Medical Group	2-8
2.2.5.5	Other.....	2-8
2.3	WESTERN RANGE SAFETY POLICY	2-9
2.3.1	Public Exposure	2-9
2.3.2	Control Systems.....	2-9

2.3.3 Clearance Zones	2-10
2.3.4 Safety Approvals	2-10
2.3.4.1 Wing Commander Approvals	2-10
2.3.4.2 Chief of Safety Approvals.....	2-11
2.3.4.3 Launch Complex Safety Approvals Authorized by Control Authorities	2-12
2.3.4.4 Safety Approvals Authorized by the DoD Explosive Safety Board	2-12
2.3.4.5 EWR 127-1 Tailoring.....	2-12
2.4 THE WESTERN RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM.....	2-14
2.4.1 Missile System Ground Safety.....	2-14
2.4.1.1 Missile System Pre-launch Safety Package	2-14
2.4.1.2 System Modification	2-17
2.4.2 Flight Safety.....	2-17
2.4.2.1 Flight Plan Approval	2-17
2.4.2.2 Flight Plan Approval Procedures	2-18
2.4.2.3 Flight Plan Approval Letter	2-18
2.4.2.4 Flight Safety Restrictions.....	2-19
2.4.2.5 Flight Termination Systems.....	2-19
2.4.2.6 Flight Safety Analysis	2-20
2.4.2.7 Flight Safety Data.....	2-26
2.4.2.8 Operational Hazard Areas.....	2-26
2.4.3 Noncompliance With the Requirements of EWR 127-1.....	2-33
2.4.3.1 Noncompliance Categories	2-33
2.4.3.2 Deviation and Waiver Policy.....	2-34
2.4.3.3 Deviation and Waiver Request Submittal	2-34
2.4.3.4 Meets Intent Certification.....	2-35
2.4.4 Range Safety and Range User Interface Process	2-35
2.4.4.1 Initial Range Safety/Commercial LO Technical Interchange Meeting	2-35
2.4.4.2 Tailoring Process	2-35
2.4.4.3 Other Range Safety and Commercial Launch Operator TIMs / Reviews	2-37
2.4.4.4 Safety Documentation Requirements	2-37
2.4.5 Range Safety “Concept to Launch” Process.....	2-39
2.4.6 Range Safety Launch Operations.....	2-40
2.4.6.1 Range Safety Operations Responsibilities	2-40
2.4.6.2 Surveillance/Clearance	2-42
2.4.6.3 Weather Systems.....	2-43
2.4.6.4 Range Safety System	2-44
2.4.6.5 Central Command System	2-47
2.4.6.6 Central Control Processing System	2-48
2.4.6.7 Launch Operations.....	2-48
2.4.7 Personnel Training and Certification.....	2-54
2.4.7.1 Mission Flight Control Officer	2-54
2.4.7.2 Senior MFCO Training	2-55
2.4.7.3 Flight Safety Analyst	2-55
2.4.7.4 System Safety Training	2-56
2.4.7.5 Flight Safety Project Officer.....	2-56
2.4.7.6 Other Training.....	2-57
2.4.8 Commercial Launch Operator Responsibilities and Requirements	2-58
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	2-61

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

SECTION 1.0 WESTERN RANGE GENERAL RANGE CAPABILITIES

FIGURE 1 - 1: VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE	1-3
FIGURE 1 - 2: FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION	1-6
FIGURE 1 - 3: 30 TH SPACE WING ORGANIZATION	1-8
FIGURE 1 - 4: WESTERN RANGE	1-9
FIGURE 1 - 5: STANDARD DOCUMENT FLOW	1-12
FIGURE 1 - 6: SOUTH AMERICAN OVERFLIGHT	1-33

SECTION 2.0 WESTERN RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM

FIGURE 2 - 1: 30TH SW SAFETY ORGANIZATION.....	2-3
FIGURE 2 - 2: 30 RANS ORGANIZATION.....	2-7
FIGURE 2 - 3: TYPICAL WR LAUNCH SECTORS	2-11
FIGURE 2 - 4: SAFETY APPROVAL PROCESS	2-13
FIGURE 2 - 5: MFCO RSDS DISPLAY ELEMENTS	2-24
FIGURE 2 - 6: TYPICAL IMPACT LIMIT LINES AND DESTRUCT LINES	2-25
FIGURE 2 - 7: CAUTION/HAZARD CORRIDOR EXAMPLE	2-28
FIGURE 2 - 8: DANGER ZONES.....	2-30
FIGURE 2 - 9: RANGE SAFETY "CONCEPT TO LAUNCH" PROCESS.....	2-41

LIST OF TABLES

SECTION 1.0 WESTERN RANGE GENERAL RANGE CAPABILITIES

TABLE 1 - 1 VANDENBERG AFB LOCAL POPULATIONS.....	1-1
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SECTION 2.0 WESTERN RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM

TABLE 2 - 1: LEAD TIMES (CALENDAR YEAR)	2-21
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS & DEFINITIONS

30 SW – 30th Space Wing
30 CES/CEV – 30th Space Wing Environmental Office
30 LG- 30th Logistics Group
30 MDG- 30th Medical Group
30 OG- 30th Operations Group
30 RANS/DO- 30 Range Squadron Director of Operations
30 RANS/DOO-C – 30 Range Operations/Charlie Flight
30 RANS/DOUS- 30 Range Tasking/Scheduling
30 SW/SE - 30th Space Wing, Office of the Chief of Safety
30 SW/SEG - 30th Space Wing, Ground Safety
30 SW/SEGP - 30th Space Wing, Pad Safety
30 SW/SEO - 30th Space Wing, Mission Flight Control
30 SW/SEOS - 30th Space Wing, Space Transportation System Operations Support and Analysis
30 SW/SES – 30th Space Wing, Systems Safety
30 SW/SESE – 30th Space Wing, Systems Safety Engineering Support
30 SW/SESI – 30th Space Wing, Systems Safety Integration
30 SW/SEY – 30th Space Wing, Flight Analysis
30 SPTG - 30th Support Group
30 SW/XPR – 30th Space Wing, Programs & Requirements
ACC – Area Control Center
ACO – Aerospace Control Officer
ADS – Acquisition Data System
ADSC – Acquisition Data Systems Controller(ROMSCC)
AFI - Air Force Instruction
AFS – Air Force Station
AFSPC – Air Force Space Command
AFSPC/DO – Air Force Space Command Director of Operations
AFSPC/DOSL – Air Force Space Command Commercial Space Lift Operations
AGC - Automatic Gain Control
ALD – Assistant Launch Director
ALTREV – Altitude reservation
approval - Range Safety approval is the final approval necessary for data packages such as the Preliminary Flight Data Package, the Final Flight Data Package, the Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package, the Range Safety System Report, the Ground Operations Plan, and the Facility Safety Data Package. In addition, Range Safety approval is required for hazardous and safety critical procedures prior to the procedure being

performed; however, Range Safety approval does not constitute final approval for hazardous and safety critical procedures since Range Users normally have additional approval requirements prior to the procedure being performed.

ARSR – Air Route Surveillance Radar

ASOS – Automated Surface Observing System

AST - Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation

ATSS – Automated Train Surveillance System

CARF – Central Altitude Reservation Function

CATEX - Categorical Exclusion

CCAS - Cape Canaveral Air Station

CCPS – Central Control Processing System

CCS – Central Command System

C/D – Countdown

CDR – Concept/Critical Design Review

CFR – Code of Federal Regulations

CMD – Command Transmitter Controller (ROMSSC)

commercial user - a non-federal government organization that provides launch operations services

control authority - a single commercial user on-site director and/or manager, a full time government tenant director and/or commander, or United States Air Force squadron/detachment commander responsible for the implementation of launch complex safety requirements

CRT – Cathode Ray Tube

CRTV – Command Receiver Test Van

CSO – Complex Safety Officer

CTC – Command Transmitter Controller

⁰ - degree, degrees

DASS – Doppler Acoustic Sounder System

dB – decibel. A unit used to express relative difference in power or intensity, usually between two acoustic or electric signals, equal to ten times the common logarithm of the ratio of the two levels. [deci- + bel.]

DEP – Directed Energy Plans

deviation - a designation used when a design noncompliance is known to exist prior to hardware production or an operational noncompliance is known to exist prior to beginning operations at CCAS and Vandenberg Air Force Base

DoD - Department of Defense

DoDD - Department of Defense Directive

EA – Environmental Assessment

EIAP - Environmental Impact Analysis Process

EIS - Environmental Impact Statement

EPC - Environmental Protection Committee

ER - Eastern Range

errant launch vehicle -a launch vehicle that, during flight, violates established flight safety criteria and/or operates erratically in a manner inconsistent with its intended flight performance. Continued flight of an errant launch vehicle may grossly deviate from planned flight, with the possibility of increasing public risk to unacceptable limits.

EWR – Eastern and Western Range

explosives - all ammunition, demolition material, solid rocket motors, liquid propellants, pyrotechnics, and ordnance as defined in AFM 91-201 and DoD 6055.9-STD.

FAA/AST – Federal Aviation Administration /Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation

failure - the inability of a system or system component to perform a required function within specified limits

FCA – Flight Caution Area or a mobile van specifically designed for and assigned the function of frequency control and analysis.

Flight Caution Area - a Hazardous Launch Area; the controlled surface area and airspace outside the Flight Hazard Area (FHA) where individual risk from a launch vehicle malfunction during the early phase of flight exceeds 1×10^{-6} . When activated, only personnel essential to the launch operation (mission-essential) with adequate breathing protection are permitted in this area; see also Flight Hazard Area, mission-essential personnel

FDP – Flight Data Package

FFPA – Final Flight Plan Approval

FHA – Flight Hazard Area

Flight Hazard Area - a Hazardous Launch Area; the controlled surface area and airspace about the launch pad and flight azimuth where individual risk from a malfunction during the early phase of flight exceeds 1×10^{-5} . Because the risk of serious injury or death from blast overpressure or debris is so significant, only mission-essential personnel in approved blast-hardened structures with adequate breathing protection are permitted in this area during launch.

flight termination action - the transmission of thrust termination and/or destruct commands to a launched launch vehicle and/or payload

FONSI - Finding of No Significant Impact

FPA – Flight Plan Approval

FSA – Flight Safety Analyst

FSDP – Facilities Safety Data Package

FSPO – Flight Safety Project Officer

FTS - Flight Termination System; includes the Radio Controlled Command Destruct System, the Automatic Destruct System, and associated subsystems

GOES – Geostationary Orbiting Environmental Satellite

GOP – Ground Operations Plan

GSE – Ground Support Equipment

hangfire - a condition that exists when the ignition signal is known to have been sent and reached an initiator but ignition of the propulsion system is not achieved

hazard, hazardous - equipment, systems, events, and situations with an existing or potential condition that may result in a mishap

hold - a temporary delay in the countdown, test, or practice sequence for any reason

holdfire - an interruption of the ignition circuit of a launch vehicle, see “safety holds”

HQ - Headquarters

HPWT – High Performance Work Team

HYDROPAC – A special notice to mariners that defines the broad ocean hazard areas in the Pacific Ocean. It applies to boats and ships.

IIP – Instantaneous Impact Point

ILL - Impact Limit Line

impact area - an area surrounding an approved impact point based on the launch vehicle and/or payload dispersion characteristics

impact limit line - a Hazardous Launch Area; the boundary within which trajectory constraints and FTSs are used to contain an errant launch vehicle and vehicle debris. Mission-essential and Wing-essential personnel are permitted within the ILLs; with Wing Commander approval, non-essential personnel may be permitted within this area. However, the collective risk will not exceed acceptable standards for non-essential personnel; see also mission-essential personnel, non-essential personnel

independent - not capable of being influenced by other systems

IRIG – Inter-Range Instrumentation Group

ISA – Initial Support Agreement

ISP – Intended Support Plan(s)

ITL - Integrate-Transfer-Launch

ITT - ITT Industries, Systems Division Holds the Range Operations, Maintain, and Support Services Contract.

JDMTA - Jonathan Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex

JLRPG - Joint Long Range Proving Grounds

KMR – Reagan Test Site (formerly Kwajalein Missile Range)

KSC - Kennedy Space Center

KTM - Kineto Tracking Mounts

KW – Kilowatt. A unit of power equal to 1,000 watts.

LA-24 – Large Aperture (24 inch) telescope located on Tranquillon Peak VAFB

LARA – Launch Accident Risk Analysis

LASP – Launch Abort Subpanel

LATRA – Launch Area Toxic Risk Analysis

launch area - the facility, in this case, VAFB, where launch vehicles and payloads are launched; includes any supporting sites on the Western Range; also known as launch head

launch area safety - safety requirements involving risks limited to personnel and/or property on VAFB and involves multiple commercial users, government tenants, or United State Air Force squadron commanders

launch complex - a defined area that supports launch vehicle or payload operations or storage; includes launch pads and/or associated facilities

launch complex safety - safety requirements involving risk that is limited to personnel and/or property located within the well defined confines of a launch complex, facility, or group of facilities; for example, within the fence line; involves risk only to those personnel and/or property under the control of the control authority for the launch complex, facility, or group of facilities

launch head - see launch area

launch vehicle - a vehicle that carries and/or delivers a payload to a desired location; this is a generic term that applies to all vehicles that may be launched from the Western Range, including but not limited to airplanes; all types of space launch vehicles, manned space vehicles, missiles, and rockets and their stages; probes; aerostats and balloons; drones; remotely piloted vehicles; projectiles, torpedoes and air-dropped bodies

LBS - Launch base Support

LCC – Launch Commit Criteria

LD – Launch Director

LDZ – Launch Danger Zone

lead time - the time between the beginning of a process or project and the appearance of its results

LF – Launch Facility

LLPS – Lightning Location and Protection System

LOCC – Launch Operations Control Center

Log - Logistics

LONOTE – Local Notice to Mariners

LRR – Launch Readiness Review

LST – Launch Support Team

LWO – Launch Weather Officer

MARSSS - Meteorological and Range Safety Support System

MAX-Q – Maximum Dynamic Pressure

MC –Mission Controller (ROMSSC)

MCS – Mission Control Supervisor (ROMSSC)

MDPS – Metric Data Processing System

Med – Medical or Medicine

MERCAST – merchant ship broadcasts

MFC – Mission Flight Control

MFCC – Mission Flight Control Center

MFCO - Mission **Flight Control Officer** - a United States Air Force Officer or civilian who monitors the performance of launch vehicles in flight and initiates flight termination action when required; the direct representative of the Range Commander during the prelaunch countdown and during launch vehicle powered flight

MFTGS – Missile Flight Termination Ground System

MIC - meets intent certification; a noncompliance designation used to indicate that an equivalent level of safety is maintained despite not meeting the exact requirements stated in this Regulation

MIGOR - Mobile Intercept Ground Optical Recorders

MIPIR – Missile Precision Instrumentation Radar

misfire - a condition that exists when it is known that the ignition signal has been sent but did not reach an initiator and ignition of the propulsion system was not achieved

mission-essential personnel - those persons necessary to successfully and safely complete a hazardous or launch operation and whose absence would jeopardize the completion of the operation; includes persons required to perform emergency actions according to authorized directives, persons specifically authorized by the Wing Commander to perform scheduled activities, and person in training; the number of mission-essential personnel allowed within Safety Clearance Zones or Hazardous Launch Areas is determined by the Wing Commander and the Range User with Range Safety concurrence

Mission Rules - a document of agreements between the Range User and Range Director specifying, in detail, those requirements and procedures not covered by this document

MOTR – Multiple Object Tracking Radar

MOTS - Mobile Optical Tracking System

Msn - Mission

MSPSP – Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package

MSS – Meteorological Sounding System

MST – Mobile Service Tower

MSU - Message Storage Unit

MTDES – Magnetic Tape Dub and Evaluation System

MTE – Minimum Time to Endanger

MTI – Moving Target Indication

NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASA KSC VLS - National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Kennedy Space Center, Vandenberg Launch Site

NASCOM - NASA Communications Network

NAWC – Naval Air Warfare Center (formerly PMTC)

NEPA - National Environmental Policy Act

NEXRAD – WSR-88D Doppler Radar

NIMA – National Imagery and Mapping Agency (part of Coast Guard Marine Navigation Department)

nominal vehicle - a properly performing launch vehicle whose instantaneous impact point (IIP) does not deviate from the intended IIP locus

noncompliance - a noticeable or marked departure from Regulation standards or procedures; includes deviations, meets intent certifications, and waivers

non-essential personnel - those persons not deemed mission-essential or Wing-essential; includes the general public, visitors, the media, and any persons who can be excluded from Safety Clearance Zones with no effect on the operation or parallel operations

NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association

NORAD – North America Defense Command

NOSC – Naval Ocean Systems Center

NOTAM – Notices to Airmen

NOTMAR – Notices to Mariners

NVAFB – North Vandenberg Air Force Base

OCC – Operations Control Center

OD - Operations Directive

Office of the Chief of Safety - the Range office headed by the Chief of Safety; this office ensures that the Range Safety Program meets Range and Range User needs and does not impose undue or overly restrictive requirements on a program

OPR - Office of Primary Responsibility

Ops - Operations

OpsSup – Operations Supplement to the RSOR for a particular test.
OpsSup is prepared by Range Safety

OR - Operations Requirements

orbital injection (insertion) - the sequence of events in time and space, whereby a vehicle achieves a combination of velocity and position such that without additional thrust at least one orbit of the earth will be made

OSM – Operations Security Manager/Operations Safety Manager

OSS – Ocean System Surveillance

OST – Operations Safety Technician

P_i – Impact Probability

PAFB - Patrick Air Force Base

payload - the object(s) within a payload fairing carried or delivered by a launch vehicle to a desired location or orbit; a generic term that applies to all payloads that may be delivered to or from the Western Range; includes but is not limited to satellites, other spacecraft, experimental packages, bomb loads, warheads, reentry vehicles, dummy loads, cargo, and any motors attached to them in the payload fairing

PCC - Photo Control Console

PCM - Pulse Code Modulation

PDR – Preliminary Design Review

PPFA – Preliminary Flight Plan Approval

PI - Program Introduction

PL - public law

PLO – Payload Operator

positive control - the continuous capability to ensure acceptable risk to the public is not exceeded throughout each phase of powered flight or until orbital insertion

PPF – Payload Processing Facility

PRD - Program Requirements Document

program - the coordinated group of tasks associated with the concept, design, manufacture, preparation, checkout, and launch of a launch vehicle and/or payload to or from, or otherwise supported by the Western Range and the associated ground support equipment and facilities

PSC – Program Support Concept

PSM – Program Support Manager

PSP - Program Support Plan

public safety - safety involving risks to the general public of the United States or foreign countries and/or their property

RADOT – Recording Automatic Digital Optical Tracker

Range - in this document, Range refers to the Western Range at VAFB, REAGAN TEST SITE, & NAWC.

Range Commander - Commander of the Western Range in accordance with DoDD 3200.11; sometimes called Range Director, when interfacing with commercial Range Users.

NOTE: Currently, the 45 SW Commander is also the Range Commander and Range Director

Range Safety Launch Commit Criteria - hazardous or safety critical parameters, including, but not limited to, those associated with the launch vehicle, payload, ground support equipment, Range Safety System, hazardous area clearance requirements, and meteorological conditions that must be within defined limits to ensure that public, launch area, and launch complex safety can be maintained during a launch operation

Range Safety Program - a program implemented to ensure that launch and flight of launch vehicles and payloads present no greater risk to the general public than that imposed by the overflight of conventional aircraft; such a program also includes launch complex and launch area safety and protection of national resources

Range Safety System - the system consisting of the airborne and ground flight termination systems, airborne and ground tracking system, and the airborne and ground telemetry data transmission systems

Range Users - clients of the Western Range, such as the Department of Defense, non-Department of Defense US government agencies, civilian commercial companies, and foreign government agencies that use Western Range facilities and test equipment; conduct prelaunch, launch, and impact operations; or require on-orbit support.

RAPCON – Radar Approach and Control

RASCAD - Range Safety Control and Display

RC – Radar/Optics Controller(ROMSSC)

RCC – Range Control Center

RCO – Range Control Officer

RTS – Reagan Test Site

REEDM – Rocket Exhaust Effluent Diffusion Model

RF - Radio Frequency

RFML - Radio Frequency Measurements Lab

RFMV - Radio Frequency Measurements Van

risk - a measure that takes into consideration both the probability of occurrence and the consequence of a hazard to a population or installation. Risk is measured in the same units as the consequence such as number of injuries, fatalities, or dollar loss. For Range Safety, risk is expressed as casualty expectation or shown in a risk profile; see also collective risk and individual risk.

risk analysis - a study of potential risk

ROC – Range Operations Commander

ROCC - Range Operations Control Center

ROMSSC – Range Operation, Maintenance, and Service Support Contractor

ROOTS – Remotely Operated Optical Tracking System

ROS – Representative Observation System

ROTI - Recording Optical Tracking Instrument/

RROC – ROMSSC Radar and Optics Controller

RSA - Range Standardization and Automation

RSDS - Range Safety Display System

RSLP - Rocket Systems Launch Program

RSOR - Range Safety Operating Requirements

RSTS – Range Safety Telemetry System

RSTV – Range Safety Telemetry Van

RTDC- Real Time Data Controller (ROMSSC)

RTS - Range Tracking System

RUSSDPA – Range User Systems Safety Data Package Approval

SAB – Shuttle Assembly Building

Safety Clearance Zones - restricted areas designated for day-to-day prelaunch processing and launch operations to protect the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel; these zones are established for each launch vehicle and payload at specific processing facilities, including launch complexes.

safety holds - the holdfire capability, emergency voice procedures, or light indication system of each launch system used to prevent launches in the event of loss of Range Safety critical systems or violations of mandatory Range Safety launch commit criteria

SAF/SX – The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space)

SAF/MII – Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force/Installations

SC - Statement of Capability
SCO – Surveillance Control Officer
SDR – System Design Review
Sec - Security
SELV - Small Expendable Launch Vehicle
SGLS – Space Ground Link System
SHF – Super High Frequency
SIF – Selective Identification Feature
SLBM - Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles
SLC - Space launch Complex
SLS – Space Launch Squadron
SMAB - Solid Motor Assembly Building
SMARF - Solid Motor Assembly and Readiness Facility
SMC - Space & Missile Systems Center
SMC R&D - Space & Missile Systems Center Research and Development
SMFCO – Senior Mission Flight Control Officer
SMILS - Sonobuoy Missile Impact Location System
space safety professional - a safety professional who has been trained and formally certified to meet the criteria outlined in the Launch Complex Safety Training and Certification Program Document
SOI – Space Object Identification
Sp – Space
SP – Southern Pacific railroad
SPARC - Single Point Acquisition and Radar Control
SFA - Spaceport Florida Authority
SPS – Security Police Squadron
Spt - Support
SPTC – Southern Pacific Transportation Company
Sq – Squadron
SRR – System Requirements Review
SSRO – Surface Search Radar Operator
STS - Space Transportation System
STS/MOL - Space Transportation System/Manned Orbital Laboratory
Stan/Eval – Standardization/Evaluation
SVAFB – South Vandenberg Air Force Base
Svcs - Services
TAER – Telemetry Analog Equipment Room
TBD – to be determined
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
TIM - Technical Interchange Meeting
TMC – Telemetry Controller (ROMSSC)

TMO – Telemetry Officer
TMVS – Telemetry Validation System
TO – Training Officer
TOCC – Test Operations Control Center
TRAE – time, range, azimuth, and elevation
Trans - Transportation
transponder - the portion of the airborne Range tracking system that receives and decodes interrogations and generates replies to the interrogations. The transponder permits the ground instrumentation radar to furnish significantly greater precision and accuracy data at much greater distances and prevents mistracking of powered vehicles due to interference of exhaust plumes or spent stages
TSO – Telemetry Systems Officer/Observer
TTV – Transponder Test Van
UCS - Universal Camera Sites
UDS - Universal Documentation System
US - United States
USAF – United States Air Force
USAKA – US Army Kwajalein Atoll
USCG – United States Coast Guard
UHF - Ultra High Frequency
VAFB - Vandenberg Air Force Base
VDL – Voice Direct Lines
VHF - Very High Frequency
VP – Vertical Plane
VPS – Vehicle Peculiar Supplement
VRP - Video Remote Patch
VTRS – Vandenberg Telemetry Receiving Site
VWSS – Vertical Wire Skyscreen
waiver - a designation used when, through an error in the manufacturing process or for other reasons, a hardware noncompliance is discovered after hardware production, or an operational noncompliance is discovered after operations have begun at the Western Range
WCOOA – West Coast Offshore Operating Area
WINDS – Weather Information Network Display System
Wing Commander - see Range Commander
WOC – Weather Operations Center
WR - Western Range
WRCC – Western Range Control Center
WROCC – Western Range Operations Control Center
WRR – Western Range Regulation
WSWG – Wing Support Working Group

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SECTION 1.0

WESTERN RANGE

RANGE CAPABILITIES

1.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1.1 Local Area and Local Population Information


Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) is located on California's central coast approximately halfway between Los Angeles and San Francisco, 55 miles northwest of Santa Barbara. Vandenberg's unique location provides 35 miles of Pacific Ocean shoreline, over 98,000 acres of varied land terrain, and restricted airspace for aeronautical testing.

The portion of VAFB coastline north of Point Arguello faces west and much of the coastline south of Point Arguello has a southern exposure (see Figure 1-1). This unique geography permits potential launch azimuths from 140 degrees clockwise to 315 degrees, enabling over-ocean ballistic and polar space launches (see Figure 2-3). VAFB is the only location in the continental United States permitting polar orbit spacecraft launches without over-flying any land mass. Table 1-1 shows the populated areas surrounding VAFB. These population centers consist of small cities and smaller villages at the tabulated distances from the nearest active launch pad. These populated areas may figure into any hazard calculations performed for a Commercial Launch Operation.

Table 1 - 1 Vandenberg AFB Local Populations

City	Population	Closest Space Launch Complex		
		SLC	Direction	Distance (mi)
Santa Maria	~69,000	SLC-2	NE	~13
Lompoc	~41,000	SLC-3	E	~6
Vandenberg Village	~6,000	SLC-3	NE	~7.5
Mission Hills	~3,000	SLC-3	NE	~8.5
Orcutt	~4,000	SLC-2	NE	~11
Lompoc Correctional Facility	~700	SLC-3	NE	~5
Casmalia	~200	SLC-2	NE	~6

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1.1.2 Western Range History/General Capabilities

In the early 1940's and 50's, an Army tank and artillery training area called Camp Cooke saw active service during World War II and the Korean War. It was also used for a Prisoner of War camp for German and Italian captives during World War II.

Between 1957 and 1965, the Air Force acquired Camp Cooke, the Navy's Point Arguello Launch Complex, and Sudden Ranch to make up today's base, the third largest Air Force base in the continental United States. In 1958, the name was changed to Vandenberg Air Force Base to honor the late General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the second USAF Chief of Staff.

Headquartered at VAFB, the 30th Space Wing (30 SW) conducts space and missile launch operations and manages the Western Range. Generally, the launch facilities on North VAFB support ballistic missile launches into broad ocean areas and the Reagan Test Site (formerly Kwajalein Missile Range), while the space launch complexes support southerly over-ocean polar space launches. 30 SW instrumentation sites are located along the Pacific coast at Pillar Point AFS, Anderson Peak, VAFB, Santa Ynez Peak, and on the Hawaiian islands. In conjunction with other ranges, principally the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Point Mugu, and the Army Reagan Test Site, the WR provides continuous and complimentary instrumentation coverage over a broad portion of the Pacific Ocean. The West Coast Offshore Operating Area (WCOOA), which extends along the Pacific coast from Mexico as far north as the Canadian border, provides an aeronautical and guided-missile test corridor. The B-1, F-15, Navy Sea Launched Cruise Missile and Air Force Air Launched Cruise Missile have been tested in this area.

1.1.3 Western Range Organization

As shown in Figure 1-2, the 14th Air Force falls directly under the USAF Space Command. The Commander of the USAF Space Command reports directly to the Secretary of the Air Force. The 14th Air Force Commander, located at Vandenberg AFB, California, is responsible for operations at the 30th Space Wing at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), California; the 45th Space Wing operating both Patrick Air Force Base, (PAFB) and Cape Canaveral Air Station, (CCAS) in Florida; the 21st Space Wing at Peterson AFB, Colorado; and the 50th Space Wing at Schriever Air Base, Colorado.

The Commander 30th Space Wing is directly responsible for operations of the Western Range as follows:

- Final authority and responsibility for safety. (The Commander or a designated representative is responsible for carrying out the Range Safety Program described in EWR 127-1, Range Safety Requirements.);




Figure 1 - 2: Fourteenth Air Force Organization

- Implements/handles non-compliance issues, and/or provides disposition of them with respect to the requirements of EWR 127-1 as they apply to range user programs;
- Where feasible, coordinates all actions between the Ranges (ER and WR) to ensure that consistent and standard Range Safety requirements and approvals are levied on all range users (EWR 127-1, Range Safety Requirements).

The 30th Space Wing Safety Office (30 SW/SE) is on the Wing Staff (see Figure 1-3). Its overall responsibility is to:

- Establish, direct, and manage the WR Commander's overall safety program in flying, nuclear, explosive, missile, ground/industrial, and system safety disciplines;
- Establish and direct the space vehicle and ballistic missile flight safety program;
- Ensure all agencies comply with the safety programs;
- Provide safety engineering, program management, and technical advice/assistance to range users and to the Administrative Contracting Officer in evaluating contracting operations;
- Assist the Commander of the Western Range in preparation of the Range Safety portion of Program Support Plans, Operations Directives, and Range contracts;
- Provide technical contract management for the safety and ordnance portion of the Launch Base Support (LBS) and Range Operation, Maintenance, and Support Services Contract (ROMSSC).

These functions are delegated to, and accomplished by, the 30 SW/SE Sections as detailed in Section 2.

1.1.4 Western Range

The Western Range embraces a large and versatile geographic area extending from the West Coast of the United States to 90 degrees East longitude in the Indian Ocean (see Figure 1-4). It has open ocean to the west and south.

Uprange and downrange support is provided by an extensive array of facilities including checkout and assembly facilities for launch vehicle and payload processing; and radar, telemetry, and optical sensors located at VAFB, Pillar Point AFS, Anderson Peak, and Santa Ynez Peak. These sensors can be augmented by similar sensors of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) located southeast of VAFB. To provide telemetry coverage farther south, or beyond the range of land-based sensors, the TDRSS network




Figure 1 - 3: 30th Space Wing Organization





Figure 1 - 4: Western Range

or Navy P-3's from the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) at Point Mugu, CA may be used. Midrange support for ballistic tests is provided by sensors located in Hawaii. The 30 SW maintains radar and other data collection facilities on Molokai, and Oahu. Reentry support of ballistic launches is provided by mobile and fixed sensors at US Army Reagan Test Site.

The 30 SW Range Operations Control Center at VAFB is the central telemetry and metric data processing facility. The Control Center is linked to launch complexes, assembly and checkout facilities, and data acquisition sites via landlines and microwave systems. In addition, the Control Center is linked to other DoD and NASA facilities for real-time transmission of data, voice, and message communications.

30 SW data handling capabilities provide a complete spectrum of services that range from data collection and distribution to post-flight analysis.

1.1.5 The Air Force Commercial Program

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/SX) (Space Plans and Policies) leads development of Air Force policy for support of commercial space activities. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Commercial Spacelift Operations (within AFSPC/DOSL) has management responsibility for launch base support of commercial space activities. AFSPC's Director of Operations (DO) has lead signature authority for the Commercial Space Operations Support Agreement (CSOSA). The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) at Los Angeles AFB retains responsibility for booster production matters. As in the past, the Wing Customer Support Office (administered by 30 SW/XPR) functions as the single point of contact for commercial space activities for the 30 SW and is responsible for coordinating initial Wing support arrangements. Once the commercial support process is begun, the support agency (30 SW) becomes the lead range responsible for coordinating with other support ranges as required to insure total program support.

The Air Force uses a variety of processes to arrange support for US commercial space operators at Air Force launch bases. AFSPC has institutionalized processes for the 30 SW to use in arranging and providing support for commercial launch operators. These processes include indoctrinating the new commercial customer, arranging use of excess capacity of Air Force launch property and services, and performing environmental impact analyses. Intermixed with these processes are the standard range documents prepared under the Universal Documentation System. Discussions of these requirements and the WR processes necessary

to support the commercial user are contained within the following paragraphs.

There are many different references that are used to arrange commercial launch support. The 30 SW has developed a Customer Handbook that describes processes for obtaining 30 SW support. This handbook is accessible through the Customer Support Office.

1.1.5.1 Standard Documentation

The Universal Documentation System (UDS) specifies three levels of standard commercial user/range documentation pairs. Level 1 includes the Program Introduction and the Statement of Capability. The Level 1 documents are used to initiate program support planning. Level 2 documents, the Program Requirements Document and the Program Support Plan, may be required to provide additional or more detailed program information, especially for the more complex programs. The Operations Requirements and the Operations Directive are Level 3 documents and are used to plan for individual tests within a program. Each document is briefly described below and the flow is outlined in Figure 1-5.

1.1.5.1.1 Level 1 Documentation

Program Introduction - The Program Introduction (PI) is the initial planning document submitted by a potential customer (the range user) to the support agency (the range) immediately upon identification of the scope and duration of program activity. The potential customer should submit the PI, using best available information, enabling the support agency to initiate resource and technical planning. This information, while sometimes fragmentary and incomplete, is of substantial value to the support agency in determining the scope of the program.

Statement of Capability - The Statement of Capability (SC) is the support agency's response to the PI. When properly signed, the SC is evidence that a program has been accepted for support by the support agency (30 SW and AFSPC). Support conditions, qualifications, resources, or other considerations, are initially identified by this document and serve as a baseline reference to subsequent acceptance and commitment by the support agency. The PI and the SC complement each other in establishing the preliminary scope of the program support activity.

UNIVERSAL DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM PROCEDURES FOR LAUNCH WESTERN RANGE




Figure 1 - 5: Standard Document Flow

1.1.5.1.2 Level 2 Documentation

Program Requirements Document - The Program Requirements Document (PRD) is a detailed full-program planning document normally required for complex or long-lead-time programs. It contains the requirements for support desired from the support agency and may contain supplemental information when needed for clarity of purpose. A PRD is submitted to assure that support capability will be available during the time period required by the commercial range user. Requirements should be submitted immediately upon identification. The user should not delay submittal of the PRD because of incomplete knowledge of support requirements. Late requirements may be accommodated, with Range approval.

Program Support Plan - The Program Support Plan (PSP) is a response to the requirements presented in the PRD and is prepared by the responsible support agency. The PSP indicates those requirements that can be met from existing resources, those that can only be met through programming new resources or through alternatives, and those that cannot be met by the support agency. The PSP is prepared on a series of forms similar to the PRD and retains the same outline and format. It is updated with revised program

requirements by corresponding revision for the duration of the program. The office of primary responsibility for all PSPs is 30 RANS/DO.

1.1.5.1.3 Level 3 Documentation

Operations Requirements - The Operations Requirements (OR) document is a mission-oriented document that describes in detail the requirements for each mission, special test, or series of similar tests. The OR is prepared by the user. The PRD and the OR completely describes the commercial customer's mission requirements. The OR must not reflect new requirements not previously stated in the PI and/or PRD.

Operations Directive - The Operations Directive (OD) is the lead agency's response to the OR and is a detailed plan for implementation of support functions for a mission, specific test, or series of similar tests.

1.1.5.2 Establishing the New Commercial Customer

The following paragraphs explain the processes by which the new commercial customer is introduced to the procedures, documentation, and requirements that the 30 SW operates:

1.1.5.2.1 New User Introduction Process

The process by which these documents and the associated agreements meld to form a cohesive commercial program begins when the potential commercial 30 SW user makes initial contact with DoT's Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (AST) and the 30 SW Wing Customer Support Office (CSO). The CSO serves as the office of primary responsibility for new programs during the introductory phase of the test mission and will remain the single point of contact for commercial space programs. The initial Customer Support Manager (CSM) is normally selected from 30 SW/XPR and serves as the CSM for the life of the program. A Wing Support Working Group (WSWG) is normally established to review and validate program requirements in the Program Introduction (PI) document. The CSM chairs the WSWG. This group is formed to review customer requirements prior to arrival and review of the PI and work customer support requirements throughout the life of the program.

1.1.5.2.2 Initial Support Agreement

If the proposed new program is sufficiently defined, and the amount of government effort required to continue a dialogue with the prospective new user is justified, then the CSO may recommend that the Wing Commander sign the Initial Support Agreement (ISA) with the commercial space customer. The ISA defines the terms and conditions for initial planning support and must be signed before the UDS cycle can start.

1.1.5.2.3 Initial Support Documentation

With the ISA in place detailed planning support can begin. The CSO will work closely with the commercial space customer to produce a Program Introduction, documenting support requirements for the new program. Once the PI is completed, The CSM will respond with a Statement of Capability (SC) outlining government support. The SC cannot represent a government support commitment until it becomes part of the signed Commercial Space Operations Support Agreement (CSOSA), and the environmental impact analysis process (see Para. 1.1.5.3.3) is completed.

1.1.5.2.4 Commercial Space Operations Support Agreement (CSOSA)

This Commercial Space Operations Support Agreement represents the Air Force's commitment to provide support for the commercial program, subject to satisfactory completion of the environmental impact analysis process. The commercial space customer sends a written request for AFSPC/DOSL to execute the CSOSA. After coordination through the HQ AFSPC staff, AFSPC/DOSL will return a copy of the Agreement to the commercial space customer, signed by AFSPC/DO. After the commercial space customer signs the Agreement, and obtains a DoT license for launch processing, requests to obtain government support under the terms and conditions of the Agreement may begin in order to initiate launch preparations at the launch site.

The Wing executes an annex to the CSOSA (signed by the Wing Commander) which describes the Wing's support. The 30 SW document becomes Annex B.

1.1.5.3 Using Excess Capacity of Government Launch Property

This section contains the process required to initiate facility siting, the requirements for leasing or licensing Air Force real estate, and the Environmental Impact procedure that is required. Before requesting use of excess capacity, the commercial space customer must first consider commercially available launch property and services.

1.1.5.3.1 Facility Siting Process

The "Policy on Use of Air Force Real Property for Commercial Space Activities," 7 May 1996, states Air Force launch property may be provided for commercial space purposes if:

1. The property will be used to support commercial space activities;
2. Its use can be supported by existing or planned Air Force or federal resources;
3. Its use will be on a non-interference basis compatible with Air Force or federal activities;

4. Its use is consistent with public safety, national security and international treaty obligations; and,
5. Substantially equivalent property is not available from the private sector on reasonable terms:
 - a. Equivalent means substantially the same property in terms of function, capacity, utility, and quality.
 - b. Available means as and when needed by the user, to the user's reasonable satisfaction.
 - c. Reasonable means that price and other terms and conditions of use are commercially reasonable.

The acquisition (by lease, sale, transaction in lieu of sale) by the private sector of launch property of the United States, which is excess or not otherwise needed for public use, is to be encouraged and facilitated, including reduced charges to the private sector for such use of government property (direct costs only).

In parallel with the Environmental Impact Analysis Process, the commercial space customer should initiate the facility siting process through the CSO. This process consists of two sub-processes, initiated by a request letter from the commercial space customer to the Wing Commander. The sub-processes consist of: (1) the explosive safety siting approval process to account for quantity-distance standoff requirements for explosive storage and launch facilities, as defined in DoD Directive 6055.9 and Air Force Manual 91-201, and (2) the community planning process, based on land use plans and constraints documented in the Base General Plan. The Base Real Estate office monitors progress and submits the results of these parallel sub-processes to the base Facilities Board and acts as the commercial space customer's advocate when the Board addresses the commercial launch operator's request.

1.1.5.3.2 Lease/License Requirements and Process

Air Force Instruction 32-9003 titled "Granting Temporary Use of Air Force Real Property" requires non-Air Force users of real estate at Air Force sites, where new facilities are to be constructed, to execute a lease for use of the real estate. Approval authority for leases exceeding five years or \$100,000 rent per year rests with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force/Installations (SAF/MII). Following SAF/MII approval, authority for negotiating, processing, executing, and administering leases is delegated to AFSPC/CE. A license is required for existing Air Force facilities that may be shared with government or other commercial space programs.

1.1.5.3.3 The Environmental Impact Analysis Process

The President's National Space Policy establishes that commercial space activities at federal launch facilities comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (Public Law 91-190, NEPA). On behalf of the commercial space customer, the 30 SW environmental office will help the customer determine which regulatory agencies will need to be consulted. The commercial customer submits copies of all permit applications to the launch site environmental office. Even when permits for commercial activities are issued to the Air Force, the commercial space company is still legally responsible for complying with their requirements. Commercial space customers must complete the Environmental Impact Analysis Process (EIAP) before the Air Force can commit support to their programs through the CSOSA. The Initial Support Agreement (ISA) allows the Air Force to provide planning support until the EIAP is complete. "HQ AFSPC Environmental Protection Committee (EPC) Guidance on Commercial Space Activity EIAP" (October 1991) explains the process for completing the EIAP:

- Air Force Form 813 - Request for Environmental Impact Analysis: This document forms the basis for the 30 SW decision on what level of environmental documentation will be required for the proposed program (i.e., Categorical Exclusion, Environmental Assessment, or Environmental Impact Statement). This process is highlighted in the AFSPC EIAP guidance package. EIAP guidance is explained in Air Force Instruction 32-7061, "The Environmental Impact Analysis Process," dated 24 January 1995.
- Categorical Exclusion - According to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Regulation 1508.2, "a Categorical Exclusion (CATEX) means a category of actions which individually or cumulatively do not have a significant effect on the human environment". The Air Force list of excluded categories appears as an Attachment to Air Force Instruction 32-7061. Generally, only previously-approved actions or actions with no significant environmental impact qualify for a CATEX. Examples of programs in this category include those covered by the "Programmatic Environmental Assessment of Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle Programs," published by the Department of Transportation's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (DoT/OCST) in February 1986. The scope of this document is limited to privatized versions of government boosters using the same facilities and flying the same trajectories as previously-approved government programs.
- Environmental Assessment - For new programs, an Environmental Assessment (EA) may be sufficient for environmental approval if it justifies a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). For commercial programs using Air Force assets, the customer must prepare the EA. The review process includes coordination among the environmental office at the launch base, (30 CES/CEV), and local, state, and federal regulatory agencies. Vandenberg's Environmental Management office has a list of organizations, their addresses

and associated points of contact for more than 30 agencies that may be involved in the review process. The FONSI is executed by 30 SW once approved by AFSPC/CE. Depending on the scope of the program and the number of regulatory agencies required to be involved, the EA/FONSI process typically requires six to twelve months.

- **Environmental Impact Statement** - For the new commercial customer whose activities may have significant environmental effects, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision must be generated and approved in accordance with AFI 32-7061. The review process includes coordination within the Air Force, a series of public scoping meetings and hearings to address any controversial issues, and interface among the environmental offices at the launch site and local, state, and federal regulatory agencies. A Secretary of the Air Force decision maker will execute the Record of Decision. Depending on the scope of the program and the regulatory agencies involved, this process typically requires 12 to 36 months.
- **Permits and Additional Studies** - Depending on the scope of the program, in addition to the EA or EIS, reports and permits for issues like emissions and hazardous waste may be required by regulatory agencies external to the Air Force. The launch site Environmental Office, 30 CES/CEV, may assist the commercial launch operator with preparation of these documents.

1.1.5.4 Summary

The Air Force's Commercial Program has evolved to provide necessary launch head support and services that are not readily available in the commercial realm. Access to these services begins with initial contact by the commercial space customer with FAA/AST and the 30 SW CSO. The process of establishing the new commercial customer at the launch site is a coordinated effort by several agencies to combine several processes, including the standard (UDS) documentation process, the commercial DoT license process, and 30 SW/Customer agreements, as well as operations siting, leasing/licensing, and environmental impact assessment processes.

1.2 RANGE DESCRIPTION

The Western Range is a complex of instrumentation and support facilities deployed over a designated geographical area and configured for the support of research, development, operations and test and evaluation of weapon and space systems, subsystems, and components. This includes all metric instrumentation, range safety associated equipment, telemetry, photography, meteorological, data processing, transmission, and communications equipment associated with launch operations. This specialized and general purpose equipment is used to measure, receive, record, and process data for evaluation of the performance of a system and its components or to obtain data for specific research, developmental, and operational missions. For current and more detailed information on the data herein provided, the Commercial Agency should contact the Director, Customer Support Office for the 30th Space Wing (30 SW/XPR). The CSO is the single point of contact for all agencies wishing to avail themselves of the use of 30th Space Wing resources. Reference paragraph 1.1.5.2.1 New User Introductory Process.

1.2.1 Facilities and Instrumentation

The 30th Space Wing is located at Vandenberg AFB. Vandenberg is located in California halfway between Los Angeles and San Francisco. The 30 Range Squadron manages all Western Range resources and conducts Space, Ballistic and Aeronautical operations in the area of the Pacific Ocean.

Launches occur primarily from Vandenberg, and all mainland instrumentation is located in California. There is downrange instrumentation at both Hawaii and at Kwajalein. There are also mobile assets that can support launches on the Western Range, and other DoD and NASA resources outside of California that can be used.

1.2.2 Local and Off-Range Instrumentation

In conjunction with other ranges, principally the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Point Mugu, and the Army Reagan Test Site, the WR provides continuous and complimentary instrumentation coverage over a broad portion of the Pacific Ocean. The 30 SW instrumentation sites are located along the Pacific coast at Pillar Point AFS, Anderson Peak, VAFB, Santa Ynez Peak, and on the Hawaiian Islands.

1.2.2.1 Pillar Point

The Pillar Point Air Force Station is the northernmost instrumentation site. It is located along the California coast, south of San Francisco. It's geographical location provides an aspect angle for launch operations which diminishes challenges which could result from looking into the flame of an outbound ballistic launch vehicle. Pillar Point also provides extended

coverage off the coast of California for aeronautical tests. It is just one of the Northern California elements in the total 30th Space Wing data collection capability. At the Pillar Point facility, there are two tracking radars: the FPQ-6 and the MPS-36; a telemetry system that includes a 40 foot antenna; and the CT-4, Command Control Transmitter. Metric and telemetry data acquired by the Pillar Point facility is used for real-time decommutation and display as well as post flight processing.

The 40 foot antenna uses an elevation over azimuth pedestal. The system is capable of automatically tracking any Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG), telemetry modulation in the L-band and upper and lower S-band frequencies. This telemetry antenna provides a valuable "side-look" during Vandenberg ballistic launches.

The FPQ-6 C-band Radar is a high accuracy, long range, amplitude comparison monopulse tracking system that can operate in both skin and beacon modes. It is of the Missile Precision Instrumentation Radar class and has undergone various upgrades to the antenna drive system, console, receiver, transmitter, and RF feed sections. The antenna is a 20 foot parabolic Cassegranian reflector supported by an elevation over azimuth pedestal.

The radar subsystems provide the data handling interface with time, range, azimuth, elevation, doppler frequency, and radar status information. The radar embedded computer system formats data for on-site recording, display, and off-site transmission.

The MPS-36 is a C-band monopulse tracking radar. It is considered a mobile radar and is contained in three trailers plus an antenna lowboy. The antenna is a 12 foot parabolic Cassegranian reflector.

The MPS-36 has an Integrated Circuit Digital Range system which assists in the acquisition of skin and beacon targets. Target range, azimuth, elevation data, and time are output to a console for display, and recorded for post operation data production.

CT-4 is an operational command control transmitter site located at Pillar Point to provide additional command control flexibility for operations. CT-4 is used to support both Vandenberg and naval operations and can be controlled from both Vandenberg and Point Mugu. The directional antenna is a 15 foot parabolic dish antenna.

1.2.2.2 Anderson Peak

The Anderson Peak optical tracking site is situated at an elevation of 4,020 feet on the central coast of California. Because of its altitude, Anderson Peak is approximately 1,000 feet above the marine convection layer. This puts it above a high percentage of atmospheric turbulence and its position provides an excellent side view aspect angle for certain launches and aircraft flight tests in the off-shore corridor.

The Deployment Mapping Instrument, located at Anderson Peak, is a high quality, Ritchey-Chrétien modified Cassegranian telescope having a 36 inch diameter primary mirror, and a 288 inch basic focal length. The instrument is equipped with a variety of sensor systems to aid acquisition, such as a low light level sensor system and a high speed shuttered telescope/camera system. All video data can be recorded. Video annotation and metric data are included with all data products.

1.2.2.3 Vandenberg Air Force Base

Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) is the launch head for the space and ballistic missile launches on the Western Range. The base is divided into two parts, North Base and South Base, by a public road that lies between the city of Lompoc and the Pacific Ocean.

Most ballistic missile launch activity is on North Base and most spacelift activity is on South Base. Most of the personnel facilities are located on North Base, as is the runway. Commercial programs are using both North and South Base for their spacelift activities.

The High Accuracy Instrumentation Radar (HAIR) is a long range, high accuracy, C-band monopulse tracking system which provides support to Vandenberg launches. It is a one of a kind radar and has undergone extensive upgrades to the antenna drive system, console, receiver, transmitter, and RF feed sections. HAIR is located on a site that provides good coverage of most launches. A main building houses the radar equipment, administrative and support areas. The antenna is a 29 foot parabolic Cassegranian reflector and is located just outside the main building. The antenna is supported by an elevation over azimuth pedestal.

The TPQ-18 C-band Radar is a high accuracy, long range monopulse tracking system that can operate in both skin and beacon modes. It has undergone various upgrades to the antenna drive system, console, receiver, transmitter, and RF feed sections. It was originally designed as a transportable radar, but is now a fixed installation on South Vandenberg. The antenna is a 29 foot parabolic Cassegranian reflector and is supported by an elevation over azimuth pedestal. The radar subsystems provide the data handling interface

with time, range, azimuth, elevation, Doppler frequency, and radar status information. The radar embedded computer system formats data for on-site recording, display, and off-site transmission.

The TPQ-39 Radar System is a mobile X-band monopulse tracking radar. The TPQ-39 consists of an electronic equipment and antenna subsystem trailer. The TPQ-39 was originally called the Early Acquisition Radar, but TPQ-39 is now the preferred designation. In general, X-band radars can provide improved precision, discrimination, and accuracy, but they operate over shorter ranges. They also have some advantages in operating at low elevation angles.

CT sites 1, 2, and 3 are located at Vandenberg. CT-4 is located at Pillar Point Air Force Station, and CT-6 is located at Point Mugu. All five Command Control Transmitter sites are capable of being controlled from Vandenberg. All five Command Transmitters are capable of supporting Naval operations and can be controlled from Point Mugu. These sites provide a command control capability including early flight termination of launches, if necessary. A dual redundant system ensures the transmission of flight termination commands.

The Air Route Surveillance Radar (ARSR) is located on South Base. It is approximately two miles inland from the Pacific Ocean, at an altitude of approximately 1500 feet, overlooking all of Vandenberg and surrounding areas. The ARSR was developed and manufactured to meet requirements specified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The system was designed for long range surveillance of commercial air routes under the control of the FAA. The ARSR is a pulse type radar and produces a map-like display of the locations of aircraft within a 200 Nautical Mile radius of the Radar's antenna. This data is presented on a Plan Position Indicator, at the master console located at the surveillance site, and is also transmitted to Vandenberg for input into the Area Control Center Display System.

A facility the size and complexity of the Western Range requires some mobile systems to augment the fixed site systems. Since Range testing requirements are not predictable, it is necessary to be able to reconfigure the Range for unique tests when required. Mobile instrumentation is a way to provide this type of flexibility. Some of WR's mobile resources include the following systems.

For telemetry, the Mobile Telemetry Receiving Station (MTRS), is comprised of a motorized van with an L- or S-band tracking antenna pedestal mounted on a towed trailer, with telemetry receiving equipment and communications subsystems. This equipment is used to receive and relay telemetry data transmitted by a variety of vehicles. The MTRS uses an 8 foot autotrack

antenna with a Global Positioning System. MTRS can receive, record and relay 4 links simultaneously.

Mobile optical systems include the Contraves Kineto Tracking Mount (KTM), and the Mobile Skyscreen. The KTM, is a versatile, mobile and precision tracking system used extensively on today's modern test ranges. Featuring high mobility, modular design, and optional remote control, the KTM can be configured and expanded for a multitude of tracking applications. This includes up to 600 pounds of optical instruments for data collection. No single instrument can exceed 300 pounds. The Mobile Skyscreen is essentially a mobile television van. The Skyscreen is placed to view the launch, either looking down the planned flight path (back azimuth view) or a side view of the flight path (program view) of the missile. The back azimuth view indicates if the missile is rising off the launch pad and following the planned trajectory. The program view indicates if the missile is programming over and heading downrange, following the planned trajectory.

The Western Range utilizes five identical-looking 27 foot Range Safety Support Vans to supplement Range instrumentation. While each van performs one of four different functions, each also provides a valuable service to the 30th Space Wing. The vans are equipped for field deployment and are completely self-contained, having motor generators to supply technical power, air conditioning, and heating. They are individually described as follows:

The Radio Frequency (RF) Measurements Van is designed and equipped to perform the following functions:

- Spectrum Surveillance,
- Signal Analysis,
- Frequency Measurements and Monitoring, and
- Stripchart and Magnetic Tape Recording.

The Transponder Test Van #1 (TTV-1) and the Transponder Test Van #2 (TTV-2) are operated and maintained by the RF Measurements Laboratory (RFML). These vans are used for field testing and troubleshooting of Range user transponders. Such tests ensure that transponders are in compliance with Range standards before being released for operational uses.

The Command Receiver Test Van (CRTV) is available for field tests on Range user command receivers and command receiver test sets. Performance characteristics of the command receivers are displayed and evaluated within the CRTV itself. If command receiver test stations are provided by the Range user, RFML personnel verify that

these test stations operate within the limits and specifications acceptable to Range Safety. This van is designed to operate at the Range user facility or other designated areas.

The Range Safety Test Van (RSTV) serves as a mobile shelter for command receiver and super high frequency (SHF) transponder testing at remote locations on Vandenberg and at off-base locations. The RSTV supports bench level testing as well as preflight testing.

1.2.2.3.1 Tranquillon Peak

Tranquillon Peak is a 2,126 foot tall peak on South Vandenberg. It provides an ideal vantage point overlooking all of Vandenberg Air Force Base, usually from above the marine convection layer. Three primary instruments are located on Tranquillon Peak: the Multiple Object Tracking Radar, the FPS-16 Radar and the LA-24 Tracking Telescope.

The MPS-39 C-band Multiple Object Tracking Radar, called the MOTR, is a transportable, phased array, instrumentation tracking radar. It has an electronically steerable beam to simultaneously track up to forty objects in beacon and skin modes, and can provide multiple scans for target acquisition. This instrument supports space launches from Vandenberg, spacetrack, aeronautical, and Space Shuttle missions. The MOTR was originally mobile, but is now installed in a building on Tranquillon Peak on South Vandenberg. It is especially suited to tracking major components in anomalous launches. For example, if a booster should explode during powered flight, the MOTR might track the major components to impact as an aid to recovery operations. It is also used in premature separation where more than one stage still may be powered.

The FPS-16 Radar is a C-band monopulse tracking system, with operation in both skin and beacon modes. The primary function of this radar is to provide data for Vandenberg missile launches and air vehicles in the off-shore flight corridor. The FPS-16 is housed in a building on South Vandenberg at Tranquillon Peak, with the pedestal and antenna subsystem on the roof. The radar system provides range, azimuth, elevation, and metric calibration data. The data system adds IRIG "B" timing to the data. The computer reformats the data for on-site recording and for off-site transmission.

The Large Aperture Tracking Telescope, called the LA-24, is located on Tranquillon Peak, with a commanding view of Vandenberg's launch complexes. A Newtonian telescope, the LA-24 consists of a 24 inch aperture primary mirror with a motorized zoom lens system. This provides high quality, stop action video, which is useful during vehicle analysis. A quick change mount enables rapid sensor changes to be made during operational

support. A video annotation system is utilized to annotate the data products with azimuth and elevation angles, focus data, camera shutter speed, field of view, operation number, IRIG timing, countdown clock, and other relevant information with respect to operational support.

1.2.2.3.2 Vandenberg Telemetry Receiving Site

The Vandenberg Telemetry Receiving Site (VTRS) is located south of Lompoc, California. VTRS was equipped and activated between 1970 and 1971. Its primary mission is to track targets transmitting telemetry signals, and to record and relay received signals. VTRS acquires data from launches of ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and aircraft test flights. Telemetry data are transmitted to the Telemetry Analog Equipment Room for distribution, data processing, and display. VTRS is designed to meet the IRIG telemetry and recording standards. Its various antenna systems are outlined below.

The GKR-7 is a 30 foot parabolic antenna that provides automatic tracking of specially equipped airborne vehicles. The GKR-7 tracks incoming signals and records and displays digital and analog angle data. The system uses variable scan monopulse radio frequency tracking electronics. Azimuth and elevation angles, antenna modes and servo errors are recorded.

The 10 meter Autotrack Antenna System is also called the ATTAS antenna. It is an elevation over azimuth type of antenna, using a 10 meter parabolic reflector, with a variable scan single-channel monopulse tracking system. The antenna is capable of operating in autotrack, slave, manual, or command modes, and it can also be computer driven. Azimuth and elevation angles, antenna modes and servo errors are recorded.

The Canoga Antenna is an 8 foot parabolic reflector installed on a pedestal, similar to the Quad Helix antennas. The broader beamwidth of this antenna is useful for target acquisition, with hand-off to a narrow beam high gain antenna after acquisition.

There are two Quad Helix antennas used to provide support on the VTRS. The antennas can be operated in the manual or slave modes only. In the manual mode, the antennas are positioned by the azimuth and elevation handwheels. These antennas are presently capable of operating in two major modes: satellite relay operations or UHF communications. In the satellite relay mode, Quad Helix #1 may be configured to transmit (uplink) or receive (downlink). Quad Helix #2

will operate in the receive (downlink) mode only, while in this configuration.

1.2.2.6 Santa Ynez Peak

Santa Ynez Peak is located approximately 30 miles east of the Vandenberg launch complexes, at an elevation of 4,133 feet. It is approximately 1000 feet above the marine convection layer. It is located above a high percentage of the atmospheric turbulence, and its position provides an excellent broadside aspect angle for polar launches or for aircraft flight tests in the off-shore corridor.

Located on the Peak is the Recording Optical Tracking Instrument. Its main tube optics consist of a 24 inch diameter primary mirror Newtonian telescope, with a basic focal length of 100 inches. The system employs a motorized zoom lens system similar to the LA-24. A quick change mount enables rapid sensor changes to be made during operational support. A video annotation system, also similar to that used on the LA-24, is utilized to annotate the data products.

1.2.3 Meteorological Support

The Vandenberg Base Weather Station (BWS) serves as the hub of weather data acquisition and processing systems supporting operations on Vandenberg Air Force Base. The center operates 24 hours every day to meet the collective needs for monitoring meteorological conditions which may inhibit or be hazardous to operations.

The systems that collect data include the following: Weather Information Network Display System (WINDS), Doppler Acoustic Sounding System (DASS), Meteorological Sounding System (MSS), Lightning Location and Protection System (LLPS), Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES), Wind Profiler and Radio-Acoustic Sounding System (RASS), and the Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS).

The weather tower system is the Weather Information Network Display System (WINDS). The towers are located near fuel storage, tracking, and launch facilities to enable monitoring of operational constraints and safety hazard criteria for the sites. Data from the entire network is digitized from each remote site for transmission to the Base Weather Station for processing, quality control, display, and archiving. Data recorded is forwarded to the Air Force Environmental Technical Application Center (ETAC) for use in engineering studies and climatological analyses required to support range users. Meteorological data for the entire range is processed each minute.

The Doppler Acoustic Sounding System (DASS) wind profile measuring system can monitor wind movement to 500 meters above ground level. The

DASS enables continuous measurements of the average and standard deviations of the three wind components, and direction and speed for ten altitude intervals between 50 and 500 meters above the ground.

The Meteorological Sounding System (MSS) tracks two types of expendable balloons carrying transponders: the Rawinsonde and Windsonde. The system provides range, azimuth and elevation data from the Windsonde transponder. It receives, processes and transmits the data to a Real-Time Rawinsonde/Wind Processing System (RTR/WPS), which is located within the BWS. The resulting trajectories are used to calculate the direction and speed for clouds of heated toxic effluents from the engines of launch vehicles.

The Lightning Location and Protection System (LLPS) consists of the following subsystems: four Advanced Lightning Direction Finders (ALDF), an Advanced Position Analyzer (APA), an APA system terminal, a local display with color inkjet printer, and a remote display. The ALDF automatically detects more than 90 percent of all cloud-to-ground lightning occurring within their nominal range of 100 nautical miles. When a flash is detected, the ALDF measures the bearing angle to the ground strike point. It then transmits the angle, number of return strokes, signal strength, and flash duration to the APA. The APA, located in the BWS, collects the flash data from the ALDF and calculates strike locations.

There are two systems used in the collection of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) weather data: the Weather Image Recorder and the Meteorological Interactive Data Display System.

The Weather Image Recorder is an ALDEN Model 9893. This photo recorder, called a Visorfax, is a stand-alone recorder designed to receive satellite imagery from various sources of GOES data. It provides unsurpassed photographic-quality, continuous-tone, image hard copy by the use of a unique combination of advanced digital computer technology and laser optics, on either paper or film, which requires no subsequent chemical processing.

The Meteorological Interactive Data Display System (MIDDS) provides the capability to build a data base by modifying and blending conventional data in a visual format, which is then used in the preparation of forecasts and products to support the Vandenberg mission. The MIDDS also assimilates real-time geostationary weather satellite data and conventional weather data.

The Wind Profiler is a clear-air Doppler Radar that measures the horizontal winds above the radar. It consists of the Profiler Radar at a remote site and a local computer system. The Wind Profiler operates in conjunction with the Radio-Acoustic Sounding System, or RASS, which measures temperature profiles in the lower troposphere. RASS emits an acoustic signal whose propagation velocity is measured by the wind profiling radar. The speed of sound, measured at each level, is converted to a temperature. The accuracy is better than 1°C. The sounding system must operate at a distance from human habitation, since many people within earshot of the acoustic transmitter find the noise irritating.

The Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) is an automated surface weather observing system reporting temperature, pressure, wind speed and direction, visibility, and present weather. In addition, ASOS provides continuous atmospheric information. It reports basic weather elements, such as sky conditions, which include cloud height and amount (clear, scattered, broken, or overcast) up to 12,000 feet and visibility (to at least 10 statute miles). It also reports basic present weather information, which includes type and intensity for rain, snow, and freezing rain; obstructions to vision, such as fog and haze; and pressure, which includes sea-level pressure altimeter settings. Other information reported by ASOS includes ambient temperature, dew point temperature, wind direction, speed, character (such as gusts and squalls), and precipitation accumulation. Selected significant remarks include variable cloud height, variable visibility, precipitation beginning and ending times, rapid pressure changes, pressure change tendency, wind shift, and peak wind.

1.2.4 Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division , Point Mugu, CA

The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division is located at Point Mugu on the California coast South of VAFB between Santa Barbara and Los Angeles. This Center is responsible for the Sea Test Range. The Navy tests air to air, air to surface, surface to air, and surface to surface weapons on the Sea Test Range.

Although Point Mugu is heavily instrumented to support operations on the Sea Test Range, it is also configured to support launches from Vandenberg as well. These instrumentation systems include the Command Transmitter site on Laguna Peak, the FPS-16 radars and telemetry antennas on the main base, and the FPS-16 radars and telemetry antennas on San Nicolas Island.

Laguna Peak is located next to Point Mugu, at an elevation of 1,500 feet. It is the site of some of Point Mugu's instrumentation, including surveillance. The Peak also serves as a site for the CT-6. Its location, south of Vandenberg and east of nominal orbit trajectories, provides a good look angle for polar launches, and covers the southern end of the West Coast Offshore Operating

Area. CT-6 utilizes data and voice communications between the site and Vandenberg.

There are three FPS-16 radars on the beach at Point Mugu, and three FPS-16 radars on San Nicolas Island (SNI), all of which can be used to support Vandenberg operations. These radars are similar to the Vandenberg FPS-16 on Tranquillon Peak.

San Nicolas Island is about 65 miles West-Southwest of Point Mugu. It is a large island that includes a runway for landing supply aircraft and full scale aerial targets. It is instrumented with telemetry and radar systems to support testing in both the Inner Sea Test Range between Point Mugu and SNI and the Outer Sea Test Range beyond SNI. One of the Island radars is specifically configured to support launches from Vandenberg. SNI is connected to Vandenberg by microwave links.

1.2.5 Hawaiian Islands

The Hawaiian Islands are located in the midrange area for ballistic missile tests, between Vandenberg launch head and the Kwajalein terminal areas. Support facilities for the Western Range are located on Oahu, Molokai, and Kauai Islands.

Oahu is the most populated island in the Hawaiian Islands. There are three significant sites on Oahu that belong to the Western Range: Wheeler, Kaena Point Radar Facility, and Ewa Beach.

Wheeler Switch is located on Wheeler Army Airfield, just northwest of Honolulu. It is a communications hub for the Pacific Area and serves to route data from the Pacific Area back to Vandenberg. It provides connectivity to remote systems, to Vandenberg, to other Department of Defense agencies and to NASA.

Kaena Point is located on the northwestern shore of Oahu. It is the location for the FPQ-14 radar. The FPQ-14 Radar System is a high accuracy, long range, monopulse tracking system incorporating both skin and beacon modes. It provides the 30th Space Wing with accurate trajectory data in support of weapons system testing. A main building houses the radar equipment, administration and support areas. The radar's antenna is located just outside of the main building.

Ewa Beach is located northwest of Honolulu, on the island of Oahu. It is the transmitter site for high frequency communications from Hawaii back to the mainland and serves as a backup to other forms of communication. This site was chosen because it is in a relatively

uninhabited part of the island where the operation of high power transmitter produces minimal interference.

Molokai is another of the Hawaiian islands located southeast of Oahu. It is relatively undeveloped and serves as a site for a high frequency receiver for radio communications to the Hawaiian area of the Western Range.

The island of Kauai is located northwest of Oahu. The primary item of interest to the Western Range on Kauai is the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF). VAFB and PMRF are similar, in that they both support test and evaluation, and training. PMRF includes a large instrumented Range that can support aeronautical, space, ballistic missile, surface and even subsurface participants. This Range is important because the radar and telemetry systems can also support Western Range operations.

1.2.6 Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site

The United States Army operates the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site. The Army group that manages the Range is called USAKA, for United States Army, Kwajalein Atoll. USAKA is a portion of the Space and Missile Defense Command at Huntsville, Alabama. The Reagan Test Site (RTS) is a Major Range and Test Facility Base covering the Kwajalein Atoll and surrounding areas.

The Kwajalein Atoll is about 4,000 nautical miles south, southwest from Vandenberg, in a line with the Hawaiian Islands. The Atoll is only about 600 nautical miles above the equator, almost due-north from New Zealand. There are approximately 100 small islands on the reef, with a total land area of only 14.5 square miles. None of the islands is more than 15 feet above the surface of the water in the lagoon. The three largest islands are Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, and Ebaddon. The Atoll forms a crude crescent with the concavity facing southwest. Its longest dimension (Ebaddon to Kwajalein) is 65 nautical miles and the average width of the enclosed lagoon is about 13 nautical miles. Water depth in the lagoon averages only 100 to 180 feet, and with a surface area of 2,850 square miles, it is the worlds largest lagoon.

Kwajalein Island is the southernmost island of the Kwajalein Atoll. It is also the Headquarters for USAKA. It has 3.1 square miles of surface area, and a full runway frequented by Air Micronesia and other commercial carriers. Facilities supporting Western Range missions include FPQ-19 band metric tracking radar, two MPS-36 C-band radars, a complete weather center and a Command Transmitter.

The FPQ-19, located on Kwajalein Island, is similar to the FPQ-6 at Pillar Point. It is a C-band monopulse radar, that is capable of manual or automatic radio frequency or optical tracking. It was originally designated

TPQ-18 in its mobile configuration and was one identical to the TPQ-18 at Vandenberg. The radar has undergone various upgrades to the antenna drive system, console, receiver, transmitter, and microwave sections. The antenna is a 29 foot parabolic Cassegranian reflector. The antenna is supported by an elevation over azimuth pedestal. Its subsystems provide the data handling interface with time, range, azimuth, elevation, Doppler frequency, and radar status information. Time is synchronized to a cesium beam frequency standard. The radar embedded computer system formats this data for recording, display, and transmission.

Roi-Namur is located at the northernmost point of the Kwajalein Atoll, about 80 kilometers from Kwajalein Island on the eastern edge of the reef. This is the location of the Lincoln Laboratories Kiernan Reentry Measurement Site, called the KREMS. The site was established to study reentry phenomenology in support of ballistic missile defense programs. Launches from Vandenberg provide near ideal Targets of Opportunity for these studies. KREMS includes a number of sophisticated radars. These include the ARPA Lincoln C-band Observable Radar (ALCOR), the ARPA Long-range Tracking and Instrumentation Radar (ALTAIR), the Target Resolution and Discrimination Experiment (TRADEX), and the Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar.

TRADEX was the original, primary sensor for the KREMS and has been operational since 1963. It served as a UHF tracker and L-band illuminator. It was subsequently upgraded to operate at VHF, UHF, and L-band frequencies and recently upgraded again to support only coherent operation in the L- and S-bands.

The ALTAIR radar was developed to gather coherent data on reentry vehicles and satellites. Operating at the lower frequencies provides a wide dynamic range, good range resolution, multiple target tracking, and high pulse repetition frequency. ALTAIR has a massive 45.7 meter diameter antenna that rotates in azimuth on railroad wheels. It employs a Cassegranian feed and frequency selective subreflector to provide monopulse tracking at either frequency. This sensor plays a role in foreign launch detection.

ALCOR is a high power, narrow beam, coherent, chirped, C-band, monopulse tracking radar. It can operate independently or in unison with other KREMS sensors. ALCOR is primarily a metric tracking radar, but it also supports weather measurements.

The Millimeter Wave Radar, called the MMW, is a dual frequency monopulse tracking radar operating at KA- and W-bands. It is characterized by high range and Doppler resolution, high sensitivity,

precision pointing and tracking, waveform flexibility and significant signal processing capability. It can function either as an independent target tracker or through the KREMS sensor network.

Roi-Namur also has some optical and telemetry systems of interest to the Western Range. These include: a Recording Automatic Digital Optical Tracker (RADOT), a Super RADOT, a ballistic camera, a fixed camera tower, a spectral ballistic camera, a closed circuit television, and 3.3 and 45.5 meter telemetry antennas.

Ennylabegan is on the western side of the reef near Kwajalein Island. It serves as the primary telemetry data collection point for the Reagan Test Site. Functions include the reception, recording, decommutation and display of telemetry data. Ennylabegan offers one 9 meter S-band auto-slave tracking antenna, one 7 meter S-band auto-slave tracking antenna, Four 3 meter S-band auto-slave tracking antennas and one L-band slave-only tracking antenna. The site also includes timing, communications, and test equipment.

Meck Island is on the eastern side of the reef about one third of the distance from Kwajalein to Roi-Namur. It is the primary launch site for vehicles launched from the Reagan Test Site. The primary instrumentation on Meck Island is a set of three fixed camera towers.

Other resources such as the TDRSS network and the Navy P-3's from the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) at Point Mugu, CA as mentioned in section 1.2.4 also provide support to the RTS. Additional specifications for the RTS can be obtained from FAA/AST's document "United States Army Kwajalein Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range, Launch Site Safety Assessment" June 1999.

1.3 WR COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SUPPORT CAPABILITY

Vehicles launched from the Western Range are restricted to certain launch azimuths because of the risks associated with overflight of populated land masses and launch vehicle hazards that could endanger the public following a catastrophic event. Specifically, public risk criteria, as shown in EWR 127-1, may not exceed a mission casualty expectancy of $E_c = 30 \times 10^{-6}$. In addition, the flight trajectory must be designed to accommodate Range Safety's capability to control launch-related risks. A sufficient safety margin must be provided between the intended flight path and protected areas so that a normal vehicle will not violate destruct limits. Also, the launch profile must not be so steep during the initial launch phase such that critical coastal areas cannot be protected by standard safety destruct limits.

How close to the continental US or any populated land mass a vehicle may fly is affected by its flight profile, turning capacity, and explosive characteristics due to destruct action, impact, or catastrophic events. This can vary significantly by types of vehicles and among flights of the same vehicle, depending on payload and other vehicle configuration differences. The distance between destruct lines and the area they are to protect is entirely vehicle and mission-specific. There is no required minimum distance from land for impact limit lines.

The overflight of any inhabited land mass is discouraged, but may be approved by the 30 SW Commander given sufficient justification and a satisfactory risk analysis. Launches, that overfly South America, have been approved for flights with ground traces which cross the continent below 40° South Latitude, with dwell time on the order of 2-3 seconds, and for which a risk analysis has shown that the casualty expectancy satisfies established criteria (30×10^{-6} collectively and 1×10^{-6} for an individual). Figure 1-6 shows an artistic representation of such a mission.

The identification of operation-related hazards and the assessment and quantification of risk is used to determine the operational constraints. The hazards associated with each source of risk (debris impact, toxic chemical dispersion, and acoustic overpressure) has associated with it a set of critical parameters and thresholds of acceptability. Changes in launch parameters (e.g. azimuth, payload, and launch site) and the need for flight safety controls (e.g. evacuation of personnel, enforcement of roadblocks, and restriction of sea lanes or airspace) will depend on the results of the hazard assessments.

Trajectory limits are dependent upon the associated risks to the "public domain" and the mission objectives. Launches with potential azimuths




Figure 1 - 6: South American Overflight

between 140 degrees clockwise to 315 degrees, with impact ranges less than approximately 3500-miles, are normally considered to be within the allowable limits. Military launches proposed outside these limits have been permitted, based on high priority justifications and risk assessments. At the present time, there are no limits on the physical size of launch vehicles that can be supported at the Western Range.

SECTION 2.0

WESTERN RANGE

RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Section 2.0 describes the Safety Organization and the Range Safety Program for the Western Range (WR) and provides an overview of the features that comprise this program. The Range Safety Program has the authority and responsibility for both ground and flight activities such as test, checkout, assembly, servicing, and launch of launch vehicles and payloads to orbit insertion or earth impact. The safety organization and responsibilities, Western Range safety policy, and Western Range safety program are the major topics discussed in this section.

2.2 SAFETY ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A description of the range organization and responsibilities of the Chief of Safety is provided in Section 1. The following is a more detailed discussion of the functional safety responsibilities of the four primary Range Safety sections (SEG, SES, SEO, and SEY) and their lower elements that are responsible to the Chief of Safety (see Figure 2-1).

2.2.1 Base Safety

Base (30 SW/SEG) Safety is responsible for minimizing the loss of Air Force resources and to protect Air Force personnel from occupational deaths, injuries, or illness by managing risks and enforcement of standards. Additionally during launch processes responsible for protecting the general public from errant launch vehicle flight.

Pad Safety is responsible for the following:

- Reviewing, coordinating, and approving procedures for pre-launch processing;
- Monitoring selected activities at the launch site and associated facilities;

- Providing operations safety manager and technician support for pre-launch/launch and post launch operations;
- Providing emergency response support and/or assistance in the event of failures and mishaps during ground operations;
- Advising the on-scene commander on disaster preparedness and responsiveness;
- Marshalling the Launch Support Team to ensure the impact Limit Lines (ILL), Hazard and Caution areas are clear for launch;
- Provide facility safety Inspection for compliance with safety directives

Ground Safety is Responsible for:

- Oversight of motor vehicle safety;
- Accident Prevention;
- Oversight of Base Safety Programs e.g. driver's training and certification, fire prevention and safety.

30 SW SAFETY




Figure 2 - 1: 30 SW Safety Organization

2.2.2 Mission Flight Control

Mission Flight Control (30 SW/SEO) is responsible for protecting the general public, the launch area, and US and foreign land masses from errant launch vehicle flight consistent with public law and national need. In conjunction with Flight Analysis (SEY) and Systems Safety (SES), Mission Flight Control uses flight safety analysis and systems safety engineering products to develop and implement real-time mission rules and flight termination criteria to control errant launch vehicle flight from launch to impact of vehicles with sub-orbital trajectories or to orbital insertion for space launch vehicles. Responsibilities include:

- Proficiency in Forward Observer (FO), Telemetry Observer (TMO), Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO) and Senior Mission Flight Control Officer (SMFCO) Range Safety launch positions;
- In conjunction with Flight Analysis and System Safety, developing Mission Rules and Flight Termination criteria;
- Developing operations requirements for Safety and maintaining the Range Safety Operations Requirements (RSOR) document;
- Maintaining the MFCO Standardization and Evaluation program; ensuring compliance with higher headquarter directives; monitoring of the MFCO training program;
- Developing and maintaining MFCO procedures, checklists and launch documentation;
- Monitors/participates in OT&E of critical Central Command Systems; Provides operational expertise to acquisition agencies and source selection authorities; While on console, the Spacelift Commander's (SCMDR) direct representative for operations Safety; Go/No-Go authority for Safety; sole authority for flight termination.

2.2.3 Systems Safety

Systems Safety (30 SW/SES) is responsible for ensuring that public, launch area, and launch complex safety and resource protection are adequately provided by and for all programs using the range. Responsibilities include:

- Developing safety critical design and operating criteria and requirements;
- Reviewing and approving documentation, design, and testing of airborne range safety systems;

- Developing, enforcing, reviewing, and approving engineering documentation, design, and testing of hazardous launch vehicle, payload, ground support equipment (GSE), and facility systems;
- Reviewing, approving, monitoring, and classifying (as public launch area or launch complex safety) hazardous and safety-critical operations;
- Providing safety engineering and developing processes and procedures to mitigate risks involved in pre-launch and launch operations for both the general public and the launch area.

2.2.4 Flight Analysis

Flight Analysis (30 SW/SEY) is responsible for providing public safety by developing criteria for the control of errant vehicle flight. Responsibilities include:

- Approving all launch vehicle and payload flight plans;
- Determining the need for Flight Termination Systems (FTS); Establishing mission rules in conjunction with 30 SW/SEO and range users;
- Determining criteria for flight termination action and develop requirements for Missile Flight Control Officer (MFCO) displays;
- Defining safety clearance zones and providing advice for the control of access to safety clearance zones within the confines of the launch head;
- Assessing risks to the general public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and property;
- Identifying and evaluating risk reduction actions such as evacuation, sheltering, and safety holds for suitable meteorological conditions;
- Developing mathematical models to increase the effectiveness of errant vehicle control while minimizing restrictions on launch vehicle flight;
- In conjunction with Mission Flight Control, ensuring that Mission Flight Control Officers are trained to perform errant launch vehicle control;
- Determining on-orbit launch screening requirements for manned vehicles or vehicles capable of being manned through the first orbit of the vehicle/payload.

Each of the Safety Office sections is responsible for initiating, establishing, and implementing range user interface processes to ensure that the requirements of EWR 127-1, Range Safety Requirements, are met. Note: EWR 127-1 is a regulation, jointly written by Eastern Range and the Western Range, that contains a common set of requirements for range users.

2.2.5 30 SW Supporting Organizations

The 30 SW/SE interfaces with other 30 SW organizations who have the responsibility of supporting the Range Safety effort.

2.2.5.1 Commander, 30 Operations Group

The 30 OG Commander is responsible for providing Range Safety with the instrumentation, computers, communications, command transmitter systems, and Range Safety display systems necessary to carry out pre-launch and flight safety functions as well as additional manning (through 30 RANS) to perform the FO, TMO, MFCO and SMFCO Range Safety functions. See Figure 2.2. Range Safety provides the 30 OG with mandatory and required support requirements for each launch activity, and the 30 OG ensures that these operational requirements are met.

2.2.5.1.1 Charlie Operations Flight (30 RANS/DOO-C) Charlie Flight is responsible for executing the 30 SW Safety Mission Flight Control mission on launch day. Responsibilities include:

- Proficiency in Forward Observer (FO), Telemetry Observer (TMO), Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO) and Senior Mission Flight Control Officer (SMFCO) Range Safety launch positions;
- Developing mission specific operations requirements;
- Maintaining the MFCO training program;
- Developing and maintaining MFCO procedures, checklists and launch documentation;
- Monitors/participates in OT&E of critical Central Command Systems;
- Provides operational expertise to acquisition agencies and source selection authorities.

While on console, the Spacelift Commander's (SCMDR) direct representative for operations Safety; Go/No-Go authority for Safety; sole authority for flight termination.

2.2.5.2 Commander, 30 Logistics Group

The 30 LG Commander ensures that all required instrumentation, computers, communications, command systems, and Range Safety display systems necessary for Range Safety to carry out its functions meet Range Safety requirements, perform to the prescribed level of reliability, and are designed in accordance with Range Safety specifications and requirements.




Figure 2 - 2: 30 RANS Organization

2.2.5.3 Commander, 30 Support Group

The 30 SPTG Commander is responsible for determining, coordinating, and enforcing fire safety, environmental engineering, and explosive ordnance disposal requirements. The Fire Department, Environmental Engineering and Explosive Ordnance Disposal are responsible for establishing and implementing their programs in coordination with the Safety Office.

2.2.5.4 Commander, 30 Medical Group

The 30 MDG Commander is responsible for determining, coordinating, and enforcing medical, biological, and radiological health requirements. The Radiation Protection Office and Bio-environmental Engineering are responsible for establishing and implementing their programs in coordination with the Safety Office. Examples of areas that are coordinated with the Safety Office include, but are not limited to, toxic exposure criteria, sheltering requirements for toxic exposure, and laser safety.

2.2.5.5 Other

Other WR agencies provide the following computational, plotting, and reproduction services for flight control planning and preflight requirements:

- Operate computing and plotting equipment;
- Perform analytical studies, formulate mathematical models, and develop computer programs to meet specifications established by SEY;
- Process magnetic tapes or other approved media supplied by the range customer and provide computer listings and trajectory output files;
- Compute random and systematic errors for the instrumentation systems used for flight control. Errors are converted to appropriate statistical parameters to evaluate the magnitude of real-time impact predictor errors throughout thrusting flight;
- Calculate acquisition times, look angle, aspect angle, and signal strength to arrive at tracking, telemetry, and command destruct expected coverage estimates;
- Maintain the real-time impact prediction program and other related real-time and pre-launch programs. Evaluate time delays in the real-time program and in associated instrumentation systems;
- Provide miscellaneous reproduction and photographic services and prepare viewgraphs and briefing slides as required.

2.3 WESTERN RANGE SAFETY POLICY

It is the policy of the range to ensure that the risks to the public, to personnel in the launch area, and to national resources are minimized to meet acceptable risk criteria. This policy is implemented by employing risk mitigation techniques.

2.3.1 Public Exposure

The WR acceptable risk guidance for public exposure to launch operations is a collective public risk of 30×10^{-6} and an individual per launch risk of 1×10^{-6} . In addition, an impact probability (P_i) of 1×10^{-8} is the threshold level for aircraft and a P_i of 1×10^{-5} is the threshold level for ships. These numbers are used as management decision points, not hard limits. The range user must endeavor to maintain the lowest risk level possible, consistent with mission requirements. Individual hazardous activities may exceed guidance criteria depending on national need, mission requirements, or use of risk mitigation techniques. The WR strives to ensure that the risk to the general public and foreign countries from range operations does not add significantly to the risk to the general public from all natural causes. To that end, the range will:

- Control all pre-launch and launch operations conducted on the range to ensure that the hazards associated with propellants, ordnance, radioactive material, and other hazardous systems do not expose the general public to risks greater than those considered acceptable by public law and state regulations;
- Conduct and oversee launch and flight operations in a manner to ensure the risks to the general public, foreign countries, and the launch areas do not exceed acceptable limits consistent with mission and national needs;
- Limit land overflight in the downrange area to cases where the total public risk in that area does not exceed 30×10^{-6} or the individual public risk 1×10^{-6} ;
- Verify that all space vehicles and missiles launched from or onto the WR have a positive, range-approved method of controlling errant vehicle flight. This control must meet the objective of minimizing risks to the general public and foreign countries to within acceptable risk criteria.

2.3.2 Control Systems

Normally, control systems on launch vehicles using the WR will consist of an FTS that meets the requirements of EWR 127-1. A thrust termination system may be considered as an alternative to an FTS, however, quantification of risks must be determined. In addition, the alternative thrust termination concept and design must be approved by the WR Commander.

- Each launch system must have a hold-fire capability that prevents launch in the event of an unsafe range condition, loss of critical Range Safety systems, or violation of mandatory Range Safety criteria. Safety holds are initiated to prevent the start of an operation, or to stop an operation that is already underway, if it violates public safety or launch commit criteria. These holds may be called if safety criteria are violated or cannot be ensured when personnel or resources are jeopardized. Safety holds may be initiated by the Mission Flight Control Officers, Operations Safety Manager, range user, or any responsible supervisor in charge of an operation.

2.3.3 Clearance Zones

Safety clearance zones and procedures to protect the public on land, on the sea, and in the air are established and controlled for each launch vehicle using the WR. Typical launch azimuth limits and launch sectors are shown in Figure 2-3.

- No space vehicle, missile, payload, reentry vehicle, or jettisoned vehicle part is allowed to intentionally impact on land. Flight paths and trajectories must be designed so that normal impact dispersion areas do not encompass land. Safety margins should be used to avoid overly restrictive flight termination (destruct) limits;
- Errant launch vehicles may be allowed to fly to obtain valuable data, but will not be allowed to present an unacceptable risk to the public.

2.3.4 Safety Approvals

In order to operate on, use, or launch from or into the WR, specific mandatory safety approvals must be obtained to show compliance with the requirements of the WR (see Figure 2-4). In addition, commercial launch operators must have an approved Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) license.

2.3.4.1 Wing Commander Approvals

The following safety approvals require the signature of the WR Commander:

- Range Safety mission flight rules, including errant vehicle control criteria for all launch vehicles;
- Range Safety launch commit criteria for all launch vehicles;
- The launch of vehicles containing explosive warheads;
- The launch of nuclear payloads;
- High risk noncompliance issues affecting public safety.




Figure 2 - 3: Typical WR Launch Sectors

2.3.4.2 Chief of Safety Approvals

The following safety approvals may be signed by the Chief of Safety or his designated representative:

- Noncompliance issues not referred to the Wing Commander(par. 2.4.4.1). The majority of deviations and waivers fit into this category;
- System Safety Program Plan (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Safety Training and Certification Plan (par. 2.4.7);
- Preliminary and Final Flight Plan Approvals (par. 2.4.2);
- Aircraft and Ship Intended Support Plans (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Directed Energy Plans (par. 2.4.4.4);

- Missile System Pre-launch Safety Package (par. 2.4.1.1);
- Airborne Range Safety System Report (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Hazardous and Safety Critical Procedures (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Facilities Safety Data Package (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Range Safety Launch Operations Approval Letter (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Final Range Safety Approval for Launch (par. 2.4.4.4);
- Range Safety instrumentation, tracking data, and display requirements for all launch vehicles (par. 2.4.4.4).

2.3.4.3 Launch Complex Safety Approvals Authorized by Control Authorities


The single commercial launch operator, full-time government tenant organization, or USAF squadron/detachment commander, submit a plan with their application for control authority. If granted, each has the responsibility for launch complex safety and will exercise the function in accordance with Range Safety Training and Certification requirements. The control authority has the option of delegating this responsibility to the Chief of Safety. In all cases, the Chief of Safety will review and approve all hazardous operating procedures and any other procedures that Range Safety deems necessary to insure such operations do not pose or create hazardous conditions.

2.3.4.4 Safety Approvals Authorized by the DOD Explosive Safety Board

Explosive site plans require the signature of a member of the DOD Explosive Safety Board. For guidance in determining the process necessary to obtain approval, the commercial launch customer should contact the 30 SW Safety Office.

2.3.4.5 EWR 127-1 Tailoring

EWR 127-1 tailoring is approved at the working level within the safety organization. Issues that arise during the tailoring process which violate policy or generate significant safety hazards are noncompliance issues which may result in requests for deviations or waivers. Such deviations or waivers require senior management approval.



TYPICAL/GENERIC 30th SW SAFETY APPROVAL PROCESS AND TIMETABLE

Figure 2 - 4: Safety Approval Process

2.4 THE WESTERN RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM

The national range system, established by Public Law 60, was originally sited-based on two primary concerns: location and public safety. Thus, Range Safety, in the context of national range activities, is rooted in PL 60.

To provide for the public safety, the range, using a Range Safety Program, ensures that the launch and flight of launch vehicles and payloads present no greater risk to the general public than that imposed by the overflight of conventional aircraft. In addition to public protection, safety on a national range includes launch area safety, launch complex safety, and the protection of national resources.

2.4.1 Missile System Ground Safety

All flight hardware, ground support equipment, facilities, and ground operations associated with activities on the WR that have the potential to present a hazard to the general public require safety approval. This approval is given when Range Safety has received, reviewed, and approved the contents of the Missile System Pre-launch Safety Package (MSPSP).

2.4.1.1 Missile System Pre-launch Safety Package

The MSPSP is the data package that describes, in detail, all hazardous and safety critical systems/subsystems and their interfaces in vehicles, payloads, ground support equipment, facilities, and launch pads. In addition, the MSPSP provides verification of compliance with EWR 127-1. The MSPSP must be approved by Range Safety prior to the arrival of any launch vehicle/payload element, activation of a hazardous processing facility, or commencement of any hazardous operation on the WR. Supporting documentation is requested as required by Range Safety. The following is typical of the information presented in the MSPSP.

2.4.1.1.1 Introduction

This section contains brief statements of the scope and purpose of the MSPSP, the type of launch vehicle, payload, and mission, a brief description of changes from previous vehicles/payloads, and other general information thought to be useful, such as sketches of the vehicle, payload, or facility.

2.4.1.1.2 General Description of the Launch Vehicle, Payload, and Facilities

This section provides an overview of the system as a prologue to the subsystem descriptions. It also includes information as to physical dimensions and weight, nomenclature of major subsystems, types of motors and propellants to be used, and sketches or photographs of the vehicle, payload, and/or facility. A synopsis is provided for each hazardous subsystem.

2.4.1.1.3 Flight Hardware and Ground Support Equipment Subsystem Description and Hazards

This section describes each of the hazardous subsystems by giving an overview of each system, and then describing each item in terms of nomenclature, function, location (using sketches), operations (using schematics and/or flow charts), design parameters, testing, operating parameters, and hazard analyses. Supporting data is included or summarized and referenced, as appropriate, upon request. Specific data requirements for hazardous subsystems are contained in EWR 127-1. However, additional data may be required to substantiate the safety of the system. Tables, matrices, and sketches are required to provide a description of component data. The MSPSP must have a subsection for each of the following major subsystems:

- Structures/Mechanisms;
- Material Handling Equipment;
- Pressure, Propellant, and Propulsion Subsystems;
- Electrical and Electronic Subsystems;
- Ordnance Subsystems;
- Non-Ionizing Radiation Subsystems;
- Ionizing Radiation Subsystems;
- Acoustical Subsystems;
- Hazardous Materials;
- Computing Systems Data;
- Operations Safety Console;
- Vehicle Data;
- Seismic Data.

The Ground Support Equipment (including government-furnished and contractor-furnished equipment) section must be organized by hazardous subsystem and must account for all GSE. A portion of the GSE section must be dedicated to personnel protective equipment.

Subsequent sections may be added to provide any other data pertinent to the safety of pre-launch and launch operations. Range Safety will request additional information, as required, in order to conduct a thorough assessment of the system.

2.4.1.1.4 Ground Operations

The following information is generally included in the MSPSP, but may be submitted separately as part of a Launch Base Test Plan or Ground Operations Plan and referenced in the MSPSP. Separate submittals must be provided with each MSPSP and must, as a minimum, identify the ground processing flow, including all hazardous operations.

- All procedures (hazardous and non-hazardous) that are to be used at the range must be listed by title and numerical designation with an indication as to which have been designated as hazardous or related to flight termination system operations. Procedure descriptions must include a separate listing of tasks so that hazardous tasks within each procedure can be identified.
- A task summary of each procedure must be provided. This must include each separate task, responsible agency, objective, initial/final configuration, equipment/support required, description, hazards and precautions, and figures where they add to the description of the activity.
- A flow chart must be included that indicates relative expected time sequences and locations of each individual procedure/task. The purpose of this is to evaluate simultaneous operations, hazards, and controls, and to ensure changes in the hazardous configuration of the facilities and hardware are identified. This flow chart must include an identifier for each procedure. The identifier contains procedure number, hazardous or non-hazardous designation, and task summary number.
- Provisions for emergency and abort/recycle situations must be identified.

2.4.1.1.5 Compliance Checklist

A checklist of all data submittal, design, analysis, and test requirements in EWR 127-1 must be provided in the MSPSP. The checklist must include the following for each requirement:

- criteria/requirement;
- system;
- compliance;
- non compliance;
- not applicable;
- resolution;

- reference;
- copies of all Range Safety approved non-compliance's.

2.4.1.1.6 Changes to the MSPSP

Changes must be summarized in the MSPSP change section and highlighted throughout the document using change bars or similar means of identification.

2.4.1.2 System Modification

Once hazardous systems have been approved, their configuration, components, and interfaces with other systems must not be modified without Range Safety concurrence. Updates to the MSPSP must be provided to maintain accuracy with current system design.

2.4.2 Flight Safety

This section covers the flight safety requirements that the range user must meet before conducting a mission or flight operation on the Western Range. These requirements are for trajectory data and system flight characteristics for ballistic missiles and space vehicles. It also covers the data requirements and procedures for obtaining approval for mission flight plans. Using the data submitted by the range user, Range Safety analyzes each mission from a flight safety standpoint to ensure safe conduct of the mission.

2.4.2.1 Flight Plan Approval

Flight Plan Approval (FPA) of a proposed flight plan or mission by the Chief of Safety, or a designated representative (SEY), is a necessary prerequisite for flight operations and tests, and indicates the hazards associated with the launch fall within an acceptable level. The range user should initiate flight plan approval action at the earliest practical date to establish that the proposed mission, or trajectory, and proposed overflight conditions are acceptable from a safety standpoint. Ideally, flight plan approval for each mission should be requested during the initial planning or conceptual phase. For new programs, a request should accompany the Program Introduction or, in any event, be submitted immediately after the range has replied to the Program Introduction with a Statement of Capability.

The flight plan approval request addresses the applicable requirements of EWR 127-1 to the greatest extent possible. In many cases, the information provided suffices for evaluation of the flight plan. In other cases, where the proposed plan exceeds normally accepted limits, additional data will be required. Range Safety will respond in writing to the flight plan approval request by issuing a letter of approval or disapproval, by requesting that a

change in the proposed plan be made or investigated, or by delineating the additional data required before a decision can be made.

When the flight plan is approved, the response letter will specify the conditions of approval pertaining to such things as flight azimuth limits (varies by program), trajectory shaping, wind restrictions, locations of impact areas; overflight areas, times, and restrictions; times of discrete events, and number of vehicles or missions for which the approval applies. The approval will be final as long as the mission remains within the stated conditions. A Flight Plan Approval is published for each flight.

2.4.2.2 Flight Plan Approval Procedures

The information that should be submitted with the FPA request is specified in EWR 127-1. If sufficient data are not available to meet the requirements, the range user should meet with SEY to discuss the program and to provide all available information. SEY will review the available data and advise the range user of additional data or hazard analyses that are required. At this time in the program development, the design of the vehicle systems may not be fixed. SEY will make the range user aware of the flight safety requirements so that the design of the safety systems and other systems will meet the requirements of EWR 127-1.

It is extremely important, and ultimately cost effective, that the range user provide all data requirements needed by SEY prior to the final design of any systems that affect safety. If the SEY processing takes two months, the range user's data must be submitted two months before systems are finalized or two months before the range user requires FPA, whichever is earlier.

2.4.2.3 Flight Plan Approval Letter

The range user is advised, as soon as possible, of the acceptability of the vehicle flight plan and safety systems. This information will be communicated by the most expeditious method (briefings, telephone conferences, and/or letters). This will allow the commercial launch operator to expedite modifications or waiver requests to comply with safety requirements. A formal FPA letter is prepared by SEY that sets forth the range safety position on the range user's request for FPA. The FPA letter is signed by the Chief of Safety or his designated representative and contains the following information, as applicable:

- The acceptability of the command control system to effectively provide control of a malfunctioning launch vehicle;
- The adequacy of a command control system throughout powered flight in accordance with EWR 127-1;

- The adequacy of tracking systems to meet the requirements of EWR 127-1;
- An assessment of overflight casualty expectancies associated with the planned launch and a comparison of these hazards to previously acceptable casualty expectancies for similar flights;
- Any restraints on the launch, such as flight azimuth or launch area wind conditions or launch overflight conditions and restrictions;
- Description of waivers that have been requested by the range user and their status;
- A statement that final trajectory data for the launch must be provided in accordance with EWR 127-1 even though the FPA is granted;
- Any other information the SEY analyst believes is qualifying to the FPA.

2.4.2.4 Flight Safety Restrictions

No missile, space vehicle, payload, reentry vehicle, or jettisoned component will be intentionally impacted on land. Proposed flights must be planned and trajectories shaped so that normal impact dispersion areas for such items, even for vehicle trajectories that include downrange land overflight, do not encompass land. A sufficient safety margin should be used to avoid overly restrictive flight termination lines. If a stage contains multiple-burn engines, the impact dispersion area corresponding to any planned cutoff before orbital insertion must be entirely over water. Critical events (such as arming of engine cutoff circuits and sending of backup engine cutoff commands) must be sequenced to occur when the impact dispersion areas are entirely over water.

2.4.2.5 Flight Termination Systems

A vehicle's need for a flight termination system will be determined on a case by case basis by 30 SW/SEY. When an FTS is necessary it must meet the requirements defined in EWR 127-1. This system must be redundant and capable of termination of thrust on any or all stages at any time in flight, up to the point of final impact or orbital insertion. The overall system reliability goal of the flight termination system is a minimum of 0.9981 at 95% confidence. The airborne FTS reliability goal shall be a minimum of 0.999 at the 95% confidence level. The ground FTS shall have a reliability of 0.999 at the 95% confidence level for a four-hour duration. This reliability goal is satisfied by using the design approach and testing requirements described in EWR 127-1. Small rockets whose impacts can be adequately controlled by pre-launch restrictions are excluded from the requirement for an FTS.

2.4.2.6 Flight Safety Analysis

SEY uses the data submitted in the Preliminary and Final Flight Analysis Data Packages to prepare safety criteria designed to protect critical areas from the potential hazards of an errant vehicle. Critical areas are generally populated, but can also include critical facilities and launch vehicles. Unpopulated land masses, boats, ships, and aircraft routes can also be considered critical depending on the launch vehicle and its trajectory. Sets of criteria are developed for each launch for presentation on the MFCO console. The Range Safety displays show real-time plots of Instantaneous Impact Point (IIP) data plotted over background displays. The background contains nominal and dispersed trajectories that define the limits of a normally performing vehicle and IIP destruct lines. A normally performing vehicle is one that does not exceed three-sigma performance limits. Any deviation outside these limits indicates that the vehicle is not performing within normal limits, though not necessarily posing a threat to populated areas. The flight termination criteria ensure that MFCO destruct action will not be taken for a vehicle performing normally within three-sigma limits. There are no destruct lines crossing South America or the African Coast (see Figure 1-6). Appropriate destruct action must be taken before the land crossing starts.

After preliminary flight plan approval has been granted, the range user must submit a Final Flight Analysis Data Package that provides detailed trajectory and vehicle performance data, in specified formats, in accordance with lead times established in Table 2-1. If the deadlines for trajectory and vehicle performance data are not met, the Flight Analysis Section may be unable to prepare the necessary safety criteria in time to support a proposed flight test or operation. In this event, the test or operation will not be conducted until adequate safety preparations can be made.

2.4.2.6.1 Launch Risk Analysis

The WR uses the Launch Risk Analysis (LARA) computer program to compute impact probability (P_i) and casualty expectation (E_c) for predetermined locations with a specified population, such as launch pad facilities, industrial area facilities, oil rigs, and population centers. It is used as a pre-launch tool to determine risks associated with the planned mission. Inputs to the program include launch pad coordinates, azimuth, population figures, wind speed and direction, vehicle failure probabilities, fragment data, turn rates, destruct line location, nominal trajectory, three-sigma left and right data, MFCO reaction time, failure times, destruct velocities imparted to fragments, stage burnout, and jettison times. The final output of LARA is the impact probability from lethal and non-lethal fragments and

Table 2 - 1: Lead Times (Calendar Year)

Vehicle/Missile	Lead Time Before Launch (Calendar Days)
Ballistic Missile:	
*PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
**FFPA (New/Existing)	120D/60D
Space Vehicle:	
PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
FFPA (New/Existing)	120D/60D
Space Vehicle: Variable Flight Azimuth	
PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
FFPA (New/Existing)	18M/6M
Project Firing Tables	9D
Cruise Missile/Remotely Piloted Vehicle:	
PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
FFPA (New/Existing)	120D/60D
Small Unguided Rocket:	
PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
FFPA (New/Existing)	120D/60D
Aerostat/Balloon:	
PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
FFPA (New/Existing)	120D/60D
Projectile, Torpedo, Air-Dropped Body or Device:	
PFPA (New/Existing)	2Y/1Y
FFPA (New/Existing)	120D/60D
Ship and Aircraft ISP:	20D
Directed Energy Systems (New/Existing)	1Y/30D
Large Nuclear Systems	See EWR 127-1, par. 2.4.4.3
*PFPA - Preliminary Flight Plan Approval	
**FFPA - Final Flight Plan Approval	

casualty expectation associated with death or serious injury. LARA output is presented in tabular form and lists collective and individual casualty expectation (Ec) by specific population location and sheltering categories. Plots are produced showing risk contour for use in assessing risks on land, in the air and offshore.

2.4.2.6.2 The BLAST Program

The BLAST Overpressure Wave Propagation analysis program is run for vehicles with stages or motors with highly energetic propellants (class 1.1). Inadvertent detonation of these highly energetic propellants could yield the equivalence of many tons of TNT. Inputs to the program include the point of detonation, the focusing of the overpressure due to terrain, and temperature and wind velocity to 20K feet. This analysis yields results that are used to develop GO/NO GO criteria expressed as estimated casualty expectation (E_c) as a result of window breakage for the event.

Data is presented in graphic form with raw meteorological data plotted against GO and NO GO criteria or as breakage and casualty figures separated into predicted breakage, predicted injury percentages and predicted casualties (given that the event occurs). From a study of this data the MFCO makes his recommendation to the Chief of Safety and the 30 SW Commander.

2.4.2.6.3 Rocket Exhaust Effluent Diffusion Model (REEDM)

The Rocket Exhaust Effluent Diffusion Model (REEDM) is run on a laptop PC in the MFCC. The results are interpreted and presented to the Chief of Safety and the 30 SW Commander. During launch operations toxic hazard zones (THZs) may be produced for nominal and catastrophic abort launches, depending on the booster type. THZs show areas of predicted concentrations of either hydrogen chloride (HCL) gas and/or hypergolic propellant oxidizer and fuel vapors that exceed maximum allowable levels identified in a 3-zoned hazard assessment methodology. SE personnel will decide, based on pre-determined criteria, whether the population center should be evacuated or notified to take precautions and make appropriate recommendations to the 30 SW Commander.

GO/NO GO recommendations will be based on the population centers threatened, their locations, prior emergent response plans, etc. When Zone 1, 2, or 3 THZs are predicted to extend off-base and over land, the analyst will notify the base command post (30 SW/CP), which will forward the information to the proper county agencies. There is a wide range of predicted weather parameters that determine where THZs will lie. Detailed SE response criteria can be found in SE Operating Instruction 127-2, Heated Exhaust Toxic Control Procedures.

2.4.2.6.4 Launch Area Toxic Risk Analysis (LATRA)

The Launch Area Toxic Risk Analysis (LATRA) is the model used for pre-launch probabilistic risk assessment. It is operated on a second laptop PC in the MFCC. LATRA is the basis for GO/NO GO recommendations regarding potential or expected toxic exposures. It contains a modified version of REEDM which computes 200-1000 iterations via a Monte Carlo technique in which the meteorological forecast elements and several other parameters are statistically varied. Input includes the internal REEDM predictions, vehicle failure rate, population centers on and off base, shelter types, health sensitivity categories, and exposure response function. Output includes casualty expectation as a function of sheltering/non-sheltering, mission essential/non-mission-essential personnel, minor/significant health effect, and individual/collective risk criteria.

2.4.2.6.5 Impact Limit Lines (ILL)

Impact Limit Lines (ILL) are established to define the launch and downrange areas to be protected. Significant debris pieces that could cause personal injury or property damage from a malfunctioning launch vehicle must be contained inside the ILLs. In the immediate launch area, the ILLs are drawn in order to provide protection for critical and/or expensive facilities, and public areas that could be exposed to risks associated with launch operations. The risk evaluated to the public during a launch operation is almost exclusively to the public outside the ILL. It is not a negligible risk.

2.4.2.6.6 Destruct Lines

Destruct lines (see Figure 2-5) are designed to protect areas behind ILLs from vehicle malfunctions that result in violation of a mission rule. It should be noted that the left destruct line follows the coast while the right side opens up for orbital vehicles. This is due to the fact that there are no land masses for a considerable distance on the right side of the trajectory. Activation of the flight termination system by the MFCO, upon violation of the destruct lines, significantly reduces the risk that debris will violate the ILL boundaries. The separation distance between destruct lines and ILLs is a function of system delays, MFCO reaction time, winds, explosion velocities, and performance characteristics of the vehicle (see Figures 2-5 and 2-6).

2.4.2.6.7 Instantaneous Impact Point

Real-time computer programs receive tracking system and telemetered vehicle data from the Western Range and other instrumentation systems. The real-time computer system computes the IIP of the vehicle and outputs




Figure 2 - 5: MFCO RSDS Display Elements

the information to the Range Safety Display System. The reference nominal and impact limit lines are displayed along with applicable destruct lines/criteria as background references. The MFCO monitors the real-time IIP throughout powered flight.

2.4.2.6.8 Downrange Safety Criteria

The downrange portion of the background display is prepared for the protection of downrange critical areas. These displays consist of flight termination criteria in the form of destruct lines, that protect downrange critical areas from the launch point to the end of powered flight or orbital injection, and informational plots of the nominal and three-sigma right and left vacuum impact point loci. The three-sigma impact point loci define the normal limits of lateral impact point dispersions, considering winds and performance variations. The real-time IIP is calculated at up to twenty points per second and sent to the Range Safety displays. Staging times and other critical in-flight events are also shown as background data for the MFCO. For vehicles that overfly the tip of South America the left destruct line stops at the point where destruct action will no longer protect the land mass for a vehicle performing within 3 sigma of the nominal. Vehicles are typically about to go orbital at this point and dwell time over South America is typically 2-3 seconds. Events that would allow separated pieces to make land impact should not occur over South America or any other populated land mass over which overflight occurs.




Figure 2 - 6: Typical Impact Limit Lines and Destruct Lines

2.4.2.7 Flight Safety Data

The range user must provide data to SEY that can be used to process a Flight Plan Approval request and prepare the safety criteria for the launch of a vehicle. The lead times (see Table 2-1) and procedures required for submitting data to SEY are included in EWR 127-1. Required data fall into three groups: trajectory data, vehicle turning rates, and vehicle breakup data. Additional information required includes propellant characteristics and other descriptions of the performance capability of the vehicle that does not lend itself to a digital format. Examples of such performance information could be typical vehicle failures, reliability of stages, and payload description.

- **Trajectory Data.** The purpose of the different trajectories (nominal, three-sigma right, three-sigma left, maximum,, minimum, etc.) that are provided to SEY is to identify an expected trajectory (referred to as nominal) and the spatial bounds of a vehicle performing within normal limits. Position data that are presented on launch-area, present-position displays define the region of user-described normal vehicle performance. Instantaneous Impact Points (IIP) may be used in addition to position data for some vehicles. Vehicles performing within normal limits in the downrange area are defined by the three-sigma lateral (right or left deviation) impact points. These data are presented on IIP displays for comparison to the actual track of the vehicle.
- **Vehicle Turning Rates.** If the MFCO is required to terminate the flight of the vehicle, there are system delays, such as time to transmit destruct signal and MFCO response delays, that must be considered to safely contain the vehicle debris. As a result, there is a time delay that may occur during flight in which the vehicle's impact point may deviate prior to destruct. System delays affect the displayed position as the MFCO monitors the downrange flight of a vehicle. The region of possible impacts can be defined if the maximum angle that the velocity vector can turn through at any time in flight is known. This established the requirement for vehicle maximum turn rates.
- **Vehicle Breakup Data.** The vehicle debris catalog is significant in the preparation of destruct criteria. The analyst must model the entire breakup configuration with a relatively small number of debris classes. Some pieces, such as bottles, motors, and propellant chunks can explode upon impact causing hazardous overpressures or secondary fragments that cover a large area. Inert pieces can have different velocities imparted to them by pressure release or explosion. A further problem, especially in the launch area, is establishing the limits of protection for lighter pieces that may drift considerably in the presence of winds. Depending on the pieces selected to represent the vehicle breakup, it may be necessary to set constraints on the wind velocity and direction at the time of launch.

2.4.2.8 Operational Hazard Areas

Land areas around the launch pad are endangered by vehicles that malfunction during the minus count and the early stages of flight. Broad

ocean areas are similarly endangered by non-nominal vehicles and by the impact of spent stages and other hardware from nominal vehicles. SEY identifies the endangered areas, quantifies the associated risks, and implements procedures to limit access of people, ships, and aircraft. Notice to Airman and Mariners, defining the affected areas, are published in hazardous areas notices, and the function of the Aerospace Control Officer (ACO) is directed toward reducing the risks to these areas.

2.4.2.8.1 Flight Hazard Area (FHA)

The FHA (Figure 2-7) is defined as that area where significant danger to personnel and equipment would exist in the event of a malfunction during the early phases of launch vehicle flight. Only Mission Essential Personnel are allowed to be in this area during a launch operation. Access through control points to the area is controlled by security forces with an approval list/letter. Those within the area must be located in blast-hardened and approved shelters. The FHA contour is based upon a risk of 1×10^{-5} to a single individual standing unprotected on the corridor boundary. The FHA and FCA below are not established to provide resource protection.

2.4.2.8.2 Flight Caution Area (FCA)

The FCA (Figure 2-7) is defined as the area located outside the Flight Hazard Area where injury or property damage could occur because of a vehicle flight failure. This area is restricted and only essential personnel are allowed to remain within the FCA during launch operations. The FCA contour, which is plotted for launch operations, is based upon a risk of 1×10^{-6} to a single individual standing unprotected on the corridor boundary. The FCA is restricted to only mission-essential personnel during launch operations.

2.4.2.8.3 The FSA Ship Box

The Ship Box is a sea corridor extending from the launch point downrange, centered along the intended launch azimuth. The corridor is defined by creating a box around the $10^{-5} P_i$ contour. All danger zones (entire zones or portions thereof) lying within this corridor must be designated as closed (see Figure 2-8). SEY provides the charts to plot targets and probability contours to show the risks to boats and ships in and approaching the Ship Box (see Figure 2-8). Launch can be delayed if an individual probability of impact (P_i)




Figure 2 - 7: Caution/Hazard Corridor Example

to a ship is determined to be greater than 1×10^{-5} according to launch area boat and ship hit contours. Launch Area support aircraft are protected by using the 1×10^{-8} boat contour. For public aircraft, all airspace corridors the trajectory ground trace passes through (up to the point where the vehicle reaches 100,000 ft.) are closed. Notices to Airmen and Mariners are issued defining the areas and associated airspace for sea and air traffic.

2.4.2.8.4 Downrange Hazard/Caution Areas

In addition to the areas that are endangered by a malfunctioning vehicle, there are areas where spent stages and reentering bodies from normally-performing vehicles will impact. Two areas are constructed for each reentering object or group of objects reentering downrange.

- **Hazard Area:** These areas are constructed based upon the three-sigma debris dispersions of each reentering object. The hazard area encompasses the dispersion pattern determined by conducting a hazard analysis. All surface vessels and aircraft should remain clear of the hazard area during launch operations.
- **Caution Area:** These areas are buffer zones surrounding the Hazard Area described above. They are designed large enough to prohibit surface vessels that enter them at lift-off from navigating into the Hazard Area in the time it takes the reentering object or group of objects to impact. All non-mission-essential aircraft and surface vessels must remain clear of the Caution Area(s) during launch operations.

2.4.2.8.5 Hazardous Area Notices

Range Safety issues a hazardous area message for all launch operations describing the boundaries for hazardous areas in latitude and longitude coordinates. The message also indicates the time period after lift-off during which these areas must be avoided. In turn, Range Scheduling issues the following messages.

- **Notice to Airman (NOTAM):** This is a notification to civil and military aircraft, through the appropriate FAA facility, that defines possible hazards due to launch vehicle operations and the associated debris impact areas. Range Tasking sends the NOTAM to the FAA (FAA CARF, Washington DC) at L-7 working days. Updates are published daily. The NOTAM must be issued one week prior to the week of the affected date to assure publication.




Figure 2 - 8: Danger Zones

- **Local Notice to Mariners (LONOTE):** This message provides hazard area notification to surface vessels in the near off-shore areas. It lists the danger zones and coordinates of the preliminary ship exclusion area and date of the operation. The LONOTE is submitted at L-7 working days as a Hazard Area Message to the Coast Guard. The notices are published in the weekly US Coast Guard Long Beach Local Notice to Mariners. The 30th SW also provides blind radio broadcast notification on selected frequencies, starting 24 hours before a scheduled operation, and notifies the Port Control Offices by telephone for posting by Harbormasters for fishermen and small craft operators.
- **Local Airspace Closure:** Restricted Area 2517 is always closed. Other airspace requirements are coordinated with FAA by the 30 RANS/DOUS Range Tasking Officer.
- **Oil Rig Evacuation:** Range Scheduling provides offshore oil platform evacuation information to Minerals Management Service (MMS) at L-20 days. MMS then informs the oil companies at L-10 days per agreements. The information is confidentially supplied to the rig supervisor. The supervisor informs the crew at L-1 day. The platforms are clear by T-60 minutes. Although the MMS agreements are currently incorporated as part of the

Commercial Lease stipulations these procedures are being renegotiated at Oil Company request for Commercial Launches.

Hydrographic Center, Pacific (HYDROPAC) NAVAREA 12: This is a special notice to mariners that defines the broad ocean hazard areas in the Pacific Ocean. The HYDROPAC is a notice for boats and ships. It is sent at L-7 working days to NIMA Navsafety, Bethesda, MD, and affected Government agencies around the World. Coast Guard units incorporate the information into their notices that are sent to customers in teletype form on a daily basis.

- **FAA Notices:**

Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF) - Altitude Reservations (ALTREV). The 30 RANS/DOUS Range Tasking Officer or his representative prepares an ALTREV request and sends it to the FAA. As the FAA requires five days notice before issuing the ALTREV they request them 5 days prior to L-5days. The notice is then issued by Oakland Center by L-3 to L-5 days.

- **Coast Guard Notices:**

Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR): This is a weekly notice package issued by the Long Beach station that applies to danger zones only. The Coast Guard receives data on Thursday of the week prior to an operation. The NOTMAR is printed every Tuesday. Danger zone 4 is always restricted to transiting vessels only.

- **Harbormaster Notices:**

Two weeks notice is required by the Harbormaster before notices are posted. Notices are published immediately and affect the area from Morro Bay to Pt. Hueneme. For information, there is a toll free number available to mariners three days prior to an operation. Warning radio broadcasts begin on L-1 day at 0900 and 1200. 30 RANS/DOUS issues a letter asking the Harbormaster to post a notice. The letter identifies the areas by latitude and longitude or Danger Zone number.

- **Trainmaster Notices:**

The Union Pacific (UP) Railroad traverses Vandenberg AFB from a point north near Casmalia to the south at Sudden Ranch. The right-of-way on VAFB is the property of the railroad and not the Government; however, the UP will slow, speed, or stop freight trains to avoid hazardous conditions associated with vehicle launches. The trainmaster is a UP employee and serves as a liaison between the railroad and the Government during launch operations. The trainmaster must be notified no later than five duty days prior to the launch for support. Notification is in the form of a letter from 30 RANS/DOUS stating the times of concern and identifying the hazard area by railway mile-markers bounding the area of concern. The Trainmaster issues no notices but coordinates with other stations up and down the line and with train engineers as required. The Aerospace Control Officer (ACO) has a direct line to the Trainmaster at Guadalupe at the Surf Train Station for realtime coordination.

- **County Sheriff Notice:**

The Santa Barbara County Sheriff is occasionally notified to close highway 246 at the South VAFB gate location, thereby closing access to Ocean Beach Park. This prevents the local public from traversing through the impact limit line or caution/hazard corridors during launch operations. The Sheriff may also be called to stand by to evacuate residents in the Miguelito Canyon area. The Sheriff is notified by the 30th Security Forces Squadron (SFS) by L-10 days. Residents are notified of the hazard and the requirement to evacuate. The Sheriff will assign deputies to monitor the area while the evacuation is in effect to prevent loitering, and protect the property of those who chose to evacuate. Communications between the Range and the Deputies is accomplished through a Sheriff's representative in the Command Post and a 30 SFS member with each deputy.

- **Ranger Notices:**

Some launch activities may require the closing of Jalama Beach. When Jalama is closed, signs are posted for the public by L-3 days. The decision to close Jalama Beach is made by the 30 SW Commander based on 30 SW/SE requirements and recommendations. 30 RANS/DOUN notifies the Security Forces who in turn notify the Rangers at L-10 days. When Jalama is closed, the Sheriff has contact with the Range through his/her chain of command and the Park Rangers have the 30 RANS/DOUS phone number for coordination.

2.4.2.8.6 Collision Avoidance (COLA)

It is the responsibility of SEY to predict the miss distance between the launch vehicle and space vehicle that are manned or capable of being manned. This responsibility extends to all jettisoned debris such as stages, shrouds, interstage panels, and Re-entry Vehicles.

The prediction is determined via a computer program that calculates when the launch should not occur due to possible intercept conflicts. The data required for the program is obtained from the commercial launch operator for the launch vehicle and from NORAD for the orbiting satellite. There is a safety buffer (approximately five minutes) added to the beginning and end of the intercept time period. The actual intercept periods are usually only one or two minutes in length. Protection criteria consists of the following:

- A 200 km (108 nm) separation between launched vehicles and satellites that are manned or capable of being manned;
- A five minute protection time between launched vehicles and satellite orbit intersections. This buffer time may be shortened by two to three minutes when necessary. The buffer is applied before and after the intercept time with the 200 km buffer-sphere.

2.4.3 Noncompliance With the Requirements of EWR 127-1

Range users are responsible for identifying all noncompliance's with EWR 127-1 to Range Safety for resolution. The three types of noncompliance's are: meets intent certifications (MICs), deviations, and waivers.

MICs are used when range users do not meet exact requirements, but do meet the intent of the requirements. Rationale for equivalent safety must be provided. NOTE: MICs are normally incorporated during the tailoring process (see par. 2.4.4.2 for tailoring process).

Deviations and waivers to the requirements of EWR 127-1 are used when the mission objectives of the range user cannot otherwise be achieved. Deviations are used when a design noncompliance is known to exist prior to hardware production, or an operational noncompliance is known to exist prior to beginning operations at the range.

Waivers are used when, through an error in the manufacturing process, or for other reasons, e.g. a hardware or software noncompliance is discovered after production, or an operational noncompliance is discovered after operations have begun at the range. Waivers are normally given for one flight and must be resolved prior to the next scheduled flight, if applicable.

2.4.3.1 Noncompliance Categories

MICs, waivers, and deviations issued by Range Safety at the Western Range are categorized as follows.

- **Public Safety Waivers.** These waivers involve risk to the general public or foreign countries and require approval by the Wing Commander. In some situations, the Secretary of Defense or the State Department must also concur. It should be noted that flight plan approvals (FPA), deviations, and/or waivers normally require extensive risk analyses that can take one to two years to perform, coordinate, and approve. Therefore, users contemplating these requests should contact Range Safety far in advance of planned launch dates.
- **Launch Site Safety Waivers.** These waivers typically involve flight hardware, ground support equipment, or hazardous support systems. To obtain a waiver of this type requires positive and continuing mitigation controls that will ensure the risks to personnel and resources can be kept to acceptable limits in accordance with policies and criteria established by the 30th SW Commander. Strong justification and supporting technical data must be provided. These requests normally take one to two months to process; therefore, users contemplating requesting such waivers must inform Range Safety with sufficient lead time for proper consideration and response. Life-of-the-program waivers are granted only under extreme circumstances. The Chief of Safety approves these requests.

- **Time Limit Deviations and Waivers.** These differ from life-of-the-program waivers in that they are for a specified period of time. A time constraint is normally determined as a function of the time required to modify system design, obtain new hardware, change or modify procedures/operations, or obtain different equipment that meets the requirements being waived. Technical data and justification must be provided with supporting risk analyses. These waivers vary in time to process from two weeks to two months and users should anticipate appropriate lead times for proper processing. The Chief of Safety approves these requests.

2.4.3.2 Deviation and Waiver Policy

Deviations and waivers are controlled through the following.

- It is the policy of the range to avoid the use of deviations and waivers except in extremely rare situations, and they are granted only under unique and compelling circumstances. Range Safety and the range user jointly endeavor to ensure that all requirements of EWR 127-1 are met as early in the design process as possible to limit the number of required deviations and waivers to an absolute minimum.
- The Wing Commander has the authority to change, deviate from, or waive any requirement in the safety document for a specific program or mission operating at the range. Based on national or mission need, the Commander has the authority to accept risks for a specific mission that exceed those defined in the document.
 - Rationale for national need or mission requirements must be explained.
 - Acceptable risk mitigation and “get well” plans must be provided since they are an integral part of the basis for approval.
- When granted, deviations and waivers are normally given for a defined period of time or a given number of missions until a design or operational change can be implemented.

2.4.3.3 Deviation and Waiver Request Submittal

All deviation and waiver requests must be submitted formally, in writing, by the commercial launch operator to the Chief of Safety. Deviations should be addressed during preliminary and critical design reviews or safety reviews. Range Safety and the range user jointly agree, during the planning phase of the program, to acceptable time lines and closure dates for all major hazardous system design efforts. This will help to identify any schedule impact allowing for Range Safety review and response to the commercial launch operator before the hardware manufacturing starts, or is adversely affected. Deviation and waiver requests include the reason for the request, full justification, analysis of additional risks (if waiver is approved), proposed methods for mitigating the risks, and supporting technical studies. Cost and

schedule impacts, by themselves, are not sufficient justification for approval, but may be provided as additional factors for consideration.

2.4.3.4 Meets Intent Certification

Meets Intent Certifications (MIC) are used when the commercial launch operator does not meet the requirements of EWR 127-1 as specifically stated, but the intent or spirit of the requirement is satisfied. A statement of justification is required for each MIC submission. MICs are normally reviewed and incorporated during the tailoring process.

2.4.4 Range Safety and Range User Interface Process

The cost of changes in hardware, as well as the impact on time schedules, can be reduced by joint planning between Range Safety and the commercial launch operator. The goal of the interface process is to provide final Range Safety approvals for launch as early as possible.

2.4.4.1 Initial Range Safety and Commercial LO Technical Interchange Meeting

Commercial launch operators should contact the CSO to arrange an initial Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) during the concept phase of a program. The purpose of this meeting is to present program concepts regarding flight plans; launch complex selection; launch vehicle, payload, and ground support equipment; range safety system; facility design; operations; and launch complex safety responsibility, to determine if there are any major safety concerns that could impact the program. This TIM may occur at any time but should be no later than the formal Program Introduction in accordance with the Universal Documentation System.

2.4.4.2 Tailoring Process

Once a Program Introduction has been accepted by the WR, Range Safety initiates a meeting with the prospective commercial launch operator to establish a High Performance Work Team. When the commercial launch operator decides and officially notifies the range that they will use the WR, the work team is activated. The goal of the High Performance Team is mutually-accepted tailored requirements. In those situations where mutual agreement is not achieved, an appeal to the next level of WR organizational responsibility is heard. The appeal channels follow the management and functional organizational arrangement. The team's task includes the following:

- Definition and identification of all hazardous systems associated with launch vehicle and/or payload;
- Description of vehicle flight path in terms of azimuth and trajectory;

- Definition of launch vehicle configuration, performance characteristics, and program mission requirements;
- Failure modes and failure probabilities of the launch vehicle and/or payloads;
- Definition and description of facilities required, including launch complex, hazardous assembly and checkout areas, and ordnance and propellant storage requirements;
- Based on the results of the initial High Performance Work Team (HPWT) evaluation, each chapter of EWR 127-1 is tailored to specific requirements for the mission. The tailoring effort progresses and becomes more detailed as the program definition phase moves from concept through preliminary and critical design reviews. The HPWT establishes a documented 127-1 tailored baseline, which is used throughout the life of the program and is modified as new data is available and modifications are made. The baseline documents each EWR 127-1 requirement;
- Documentation is maintained by the team regarding agreements, problem issue closeouts, waivers, deviations, and meets intent certifications.

Membership on the HPWT includes Range Safety representatives responsible for flight termination system design, flight plan approval, destruct criteria development, system safety, and facilities design. Depending on size and scope of the mission and/or the program, Range Safety membership can range from one to four individuals. The commercial launch operator is requested to provide participants who are familiar with, and responsible for, development of the FTS, launch vehicle and payload configuration, vehicle performance characteristics, failure modes, breakup parameters, operational flow process, facility requirements, and launch vehicle hazardous systems. This could require participation from three to ten individuals from the commercial launch operator's organization. Each new program is defined from the concept phase through the critical design review, and includes the following:

- Complete vehicle description, including number of stages, types of propellant, payload description, type of guidance system;
- Vehicle performance and mission characteristics and planned number of launches;
- Planned launch azimuth and trajectories, acceleration and velocity, and identification of landmass overflight are provided in a preliminary form as soon as possible and modified as more detail is available. Vehicle thrust and weight ratios, and acceleration parameters are defined;
- Turn rates, Max-Q and time of Max-Q, malfunction time, and breakup characteristics are developed and defined. Breakup characteristics based on failure modes and failure probabilities are developed;

- Requirement for risk assessment is defined, and schedules are developed to determine need dates;
- Preliminary destruct criteria and mission rules are defined, and FTS requirements are defined/tailored to meet specific programs;
- The tailored version of EWR 127-1 will be used in the design, qualification and acceptance tests, data submittals, and Range Safety review and approval.

2.4.4.3 Other Range Safety and Commercial Launch Operator TIMs and Reviews

Commercial launch operators and Range Safety jointly agree to arrange the following TIMs and reviews as necessary:

- Flight Safety TIMs;
- As required, combined or independent safety reviews in association with the Concept Design Review (CDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), and Critical Design Review (CDR) for launch vehicle, payload, and associated ground support equipment design, airborne Range Safety System and associated ground support equipment design, critical facility design, and ground operations plans;
 - CDRs provide design and operations detail to at least the system level;
 - PDRs provide design and operations detail to at least the subsystem and box level;
 - CDRs provide design and operating detail to the component and piece part level;
- Hazardous and Safety Critical Procedures TIMs;
- Other TIMs, reviews, and meetings as necessary.

2.4.4.4 Safety Documentation Requirements

Chapters 1 through 7 of EWR 127-1 have Documentation Requirements sections. These sections describe the information that must be submitted and the processes to obtain the necessary approvals to launch from the WR.

- Tailored EWR 127-1, System Safety Program Plan, Noncompliance Requests, and Safety Training and Certification Plan;
 - If desired, a range user and Range Safety jointly tailored EWR 127-1 may be developed (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 1, Appendix 1A);
 - A Systems Safety Program Plan (SSPP) must be approved at least 45 days prior to any program CDR (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 1, Appendix 1B);

- Noncompliance requests must be submitted for all identified noncompliance's to the document (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 1, Appendix 1C);
 - If a control authority desires to assume launch complex safety responsibility, a Safety Training and Certification Plan must be approved by Range Safety prior to assumption of this responsibility.
- Flight Data Packages (FDP), Intended Support Plans (ISP), and Directed Energy Plans (DEP);
 - The Preliminary FDP and Final FDP must be approved prior to the final Launch Readiness Reviews (LRRs);
 - ISPs must be approved prior to the LRR;
 - DEPs must be approved prior to the LRR;
 - Content requirements may be found in EWR 127-1, Chapter 2.
- Missile System Pre-launch Safety Package. The MSPSP, including design documentation, initial test plans and test reports, and recertification requirements for all hazardous and safety critical launch vehicle and payload systems, ground support equipment, facilities, their interfaces and operations, shall be approved prior to hardware arrival and/or use at the range (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 3 and Appendix 3A);
- Airborne Range Safety System Report. The airborne RSSR, including all design documentation, test plans, and test reports for the Flight Termination System, Range Tracking System, and Telemetry Data Tracking System must be approved prior to launch (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 4 and Appendix 4A);
- Ground Operations Plan and Hazardous and Safety Critical Procedures (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 6 and Appendixes 6A and 6B);
 - The GOP must be approved prior to the start of operations at the range;
 - Hazardous and safety critical procedures must be approved by Range Safety prior to their use at the range.
- Facilities Safety Data Package. The FSDP must be approved prior to facility use (See EWR 127-1, Chapter 5 and Appendix 5A);
- Range Safety Operations Requirement (RSOR). Range Safety develops and publishes a Range Safety Operations Requirement (RSOR) document for each applicable launch vehicle. The RSOR is approved by the Chief of Safety or his designated representative and distributed no later than L-60 days. It documents exceptions to the standard provisions of EWR 127-1 and may also levy additional safety requirements peculiar to a launch vehicle series. Range Safety instrumentation, tracking data and display requirements are referenced in this document;

- Operations Supplement (OpsSup). Range Safety also develops and publishes an OpsSup containing additional information or requirements particular to a given launch and which are not contained in the RSOR or EWR 127-1. The OpsSup is approved by the Chief of Safety or his designated representative and distributed no later than L-5 working days for each launch operation. Range Safety instrumentation, tracking data and display requirements are also referenced in this document;
- Launch Operations Approval Letter. 30 SW/SE Launch Operations Approval to launch from or onto the range must be obtained by the commercial launch operator not later than the scheduled LRR. Issuance of this letter depends on the range user having obtained the previously required approvals described in EWR 127-1, Chapter 1;
- Final Range Safety Approval to Launch.
 - Holdfire checks, Range Safety System checks, and other safety critical checks must be performed satisfactorily; environmental conditions must be met; and all Range Safety launch commit criteria must be “green” prior to final approval to launch;
 - Given that holdfire checks, Range Safety System checks, other safety critical checks, and environmental conditions are satisfactory, and all Range Safety launch commit criteria are “green”, Range Safety will provide a final approval to launch as follows: The MFCO issues a “GREEN to go” electronically through the hold-fire indicator system and a verbal call “Safety is sending a green.”

2.4.5 Range Safety “Concept to Launch” Process

The overall Range Safety process from “concept to launch” for new launch vehicles is shown in Figure 2-9. This process may be tailored to apply to payloads, ground support equipment, critical facilities, and/or hazardous and safety critical operations. The top row of boxes represents the sub-processes for establishing the program concept and applicable Range Safety requirements. The second row of boxes represents the sub-processes for analysis, design, and test for the program. The third row of boxes represents the sub-processes for operations and launch at the range. Details of the steps of this process can be found in the applicable Chapters of EWR 127-1. In addition, the Range User Handbook describes this process in greater detail. NOTE: Appendix 1F of EWR 127-1 contains a detailed, tailored version of this process specifically developed for generic payloads and payload buses.

Range Safety milestones are those events that must occur for Range Safety to approve a program during the “concept to launch” cycle. Time frames and event schedules vary depending upon the complexity of the program. The time frames in Figure 2-9 provide a general schedule of events as guidance

for new, major launch vehicle programs. For smaller vehicles and payloads, these time frames can be compressed to a year or less. Time frame requirements for Range Safety and the range users throughout EWR 127-1 are baselines for all programs; however, they may be altered during the tailoring process.

2.4.6 Range Safety Launch Operations

This section contains policies, identifies requirements, and describes procedures used by Mission Flight Control Officers (MFCOs), acting for the Wing Range Commander, to maintain positive control of ballistic missiles and space vehicles launched from the Western Range.

2.4.6.1 Range Safety Operations Responsibilities

The MFCO is responsible for in-flight safety that includes taking all necessary precautions to minimize the risks to life and property, while not unduly restricting a non-nominal vehicle that has not violated flight termination criteria. Air Force officers and DOD civilians serve as MFCOs. In addition to the two MFCOs manning the two safety consoles in the Test Operations Control Center (TOCC), there are supporting MFCOs at the telemetry console and at the Forward Observer positions.

The capability to ensure that launched vehicles do not violate approved flight rules is imperative for the public safety; therefore, the primary responsibility of the MFCO is to monitor the progress of a launched missile or space vehicle and determine if its flight should continue or be terminated. The MFCO will normally take flight termination action under the following conditions.

- Obviously Erratic Flight - Vehicle performance is such that the potential exists for loss of flight termination control as the result of a gross flight deviation or obviously erratic flight, and further flight is likely to increase public risk. This action may be taken even though the launch vehicle has not violated flight safety criteria;
- Flight Safety Criteria Violation - Valid data shows that the launch vehicle has violated established flight safety criteria;




Figure 2 - 9: Range Safety “Concept to Launch” Process

- Performance Unknown - Launch vehicle performance is unknown and the capability exists to violate flight safety criteria. NOTE: If the launch vehicle has been nominal for an extended period of flight before the status becomes unknown, the MFCO may allow the flight to continue;
- At the written request of the range user, the MFCO may implement special command requirements such as FUEL CUTOFF or SAFE (RF DISABLE).

Flight termination for liquid-fuel boosters consists of fuel cutoff (arm command) followed by destruct (destruct command). In some cases, destruct action may not be required after engine shutdown (thrust termination) has been confirmed. For solid-propellant boosters, there is no means to terminate thrust except to send the destruct command.

2.4.6.2 Surveillance/Clearance

Surveillance and clearance of land, sea, and air areas in the vicinity of the WR is necessary to ensure that launch vehicle operations take place in a safe environment.

2.4.6.2.1 Air Control operations

The Aerospace Control Officer (ACO) controls those geographic areas specifically assigned to the range during launch operations, exercises control of all traffic, surveillance, and display equipment to assure that airspace, water, and land areas specified by SEY are clear of unauthorized ships, aircraft, vehicles, trains, and personnel during launch. The ACO is a member of the 30 RANS (Range Squadron) who informs the MFCO of the current status and changes in status of the hazard and impact areas.

An Air Controller is responsible for the control of assigned launch support helicopters and for the reporting and display of contacts visually sighted and reported by helicopter personnel. The controller keeps the ACO informed of the location of personnel and vehicles in danger, hazard, or caution areas during launch operations.

2.4.6.2.2 Surface Surveillance

The Air Controller provides command and control of the surveillance aircraft assigned to clearance of over-water areas adjacent to the WR. The primary mission of the surveillance aircraft is to locate and identify vessels present in off-shore areas and to pass requests and instructions initiated by the ACO to such vessels. The surveillance aircraft is only used on selected operations.

The Surface Search Radar Operator assures that all surface contacts in the shipping hazard area are monitored by search radar. All contacts detected by the search radar are reported to the Precision Surface Plotter. The Precision Plot Board operator receives range and bearings to all surface contacts

within, or expected to enter, the designated hazard areas. Contacts are plotted on appropriate charts and computations of course and speed are provided that predict the time targets will penetrate and clear hazard areas. The targets will also be predicted ahead to window opening plotted on a table mounted chart and made available to the MFCO via a video link.

Advance notices to local Harbormasters advise marine vessels and the US Coast Guard of Danger Zone closures. The US Coast Guard, in turn, broadcasts the information on the standard marine frequencies for all mariners. Ships at sea are advised of the hazard area by merchant ship broadcasts (MERCASST) and Hydrographic Notices to Mariners in the Pacific (HYDROPACS). Aircraft pilots on overseas and domestic routes are advised of hazard areas by a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) (see paragraph 2.4.2.8.5).

As part of this surveillance effort, a service contract with the Union Pacific (UP) provides for reporting of train traffic through VAFB during missile countdowns and launches. The UP provides a trainmaster stationed at Guadalupe train station for 30 SW missile operations who is in communication with the ACO via direct telephone line. The ACO provides appropriate telephone notices and radio broadcasts on T-1 day. On all launches that require protection of UP railroad track, the ACO ensures that an operator is provided for the Automated Train Surveillance System (ATSS).

2.4.6.2.3 Automated Train Surveillance System

The ATSS consists of sensors located along the railroad tracks at various points from Guadalupe (north of VAFB) to Gaviota (southeast of VAFB). A central processor and displays are located in the Area Control Center (ACC). Passing trains activate the sensors and the processor displays their signals in the ACC and may necessitate a launch hold. The ATSS provides the ACO with real-time information on train movement so that they can predict times into, and out of, protected areas.

2.4.6.3 Weather Systems

Weather support is provided by personnel of the 30th Weather Squadron, 30th Operations Group, who operate the VAFB weather support facility. In addition to weather forecaster, equipment maintenance, and surface, upper-atmospheric, and ionospheric observer personnel, a team of meteorologists is assigned to provide the experience and expertise necessary to support the 30 SW mission. The team provides mission-tailored support for specific missions and consultation services to staff agencies and range users during all phases of program evolution. Supporting agencies may include the other National Ranges, the 41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing, the Air Force Global Weather Central, the USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, or the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory.

The MDPS performs wind-effects calculations for Range Safety on the morning of L-1 day and again at approximately L-5 h on launch day for all major launches. The following procedures are established:

- By L-45 days, Flight Analysis forwards a Range Order to the ROMSSC defining station constants, ballistic coefficients, and trajectory data to be used in developing debris risk assessments and RSDS background displays;
- On L-1 day and at the time specified in the RSOR for each vehicle, Range Weather Operations provides forecasts of T-0 files. The wind files are used for all pre-launch safety risk assessments;
- The Range Safety wind check program is run by L-4.5 h to provide an indication of how the actual winds compare to the Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG) statistical winds. The results are made available to Flight Analysis;
- If a HOLD invalidates the predicted wind data, or if a later wind prediction is made, it may be necessary to repeat the above calculations as late as T-1 h.

2.4.6.4 Range Safety System

Personnel of the ROMSSC provide the Mission Flight Control Officer with real-time vehicle flight performance data, with the means to terminate the flight of vehicles that violate safety constraints, and with the communications necessary to ensure safety criteria are met. The Missile Flight Control Center (MFCC), located within the Western Range Control Center (WRCC), Bldg. 7000, serves as the control area from which flight termination commands can be initiated in cases of errant or malfunctioning launch vehicles. The MFCC is comprised of several consoles and operating positions that help to insure that the MFCO has the real-time display of launch vehicle position to assist in the mission abort decision if flight criteria are violated. The MFCC is the central control point for all 30 SW vehicle flight control-related activities. Several different consoles are available to control and monitor the range. Each console controller performs specific tests and simulations with his assigned systems to ensure they are ready for real-time launch support. The following is a functional description of the consoles and activities that support the MFCO.

2.4.6.4.1 Real-Time Data Controller (RTDC)

The RTDC is responsible for controlling and validating the range tracking sensors providing data, and the vehicle flight control computers that process the data for display in the MFCC. Various tests, including simulations and playbacks of previously-recorded vehicle launches, are used to insure that data to be displayed in the MFCC accurately and precisely present vehicle position and performance. The RTDC console is capable of both automatic

and manual selection of tracking sources. Two CRT displays provide visual vehicle position data and status information on all tracking systems. The RTDC will deselect invalid tracking systems from being used in calculating acquisition outputs.

2.4.6.4.2 Acquisition Data Systems Controller (ADSC)

The ADSC is responsible for providing “best source” acquisition data to the various tracking sensors. The ADSC performs tests and validations with the primary Acquisition Display System (ADS) and the secondary Digital Information Processing Systems (DIPS). Both of these computers provide unclassified acquisition data. The ADSC console is capable of both manual and automatic selection of acquisition data. Two CRT displays provide information on the quality of each radar track.

2.4.6.4.3 Mission Flight Control Officer Console

The MFCO is responsible for missile flight control. From his console, the MFCO is able to monitor launch vehicle performance data acquired by radar, telemetry, and optical tracking systems. The MFCO console contains the control switches required to initiate the flight termination sequence. The Senior MFCO (SMFCO) is collocated with the MFCO on an identical console and assists with problems during the pre-launch countdown and, when time permits, provides information and concurrence with the decision to terminate vehicle flight. The SMFCO monitors displays and communicates with range safety support personnel and other agencies.

2.4.6.4.4 Range Safety Telemetry System

Specific telemetry display requirements for a particular mission are listed in the Range Safety Operations Requirements document (i.e., vehicle chamber pressure, roll, pitch, and yaw, FTS status). Database parameters can be selected for each channel to illustrate out-of-tolerance conditions by a change of color or flashing conditions. This console is manned by personnel from the Missile Flight Control Section (SEO) and, on occasion, personnel from the SEY Section.

2.4.6.4.5 Command Transmitter Controller (CTC)

The Command Transmitter Console operator controls the configuration of the remote command transmitters. It is a CTC operator's responsibility to provide the MFCO with a command transmitter site in proper configuration at all times. The CTC is equipped with controls and feedbacks for all functions required to control the command transmitter sites. The CTC has displays to monitor the initiation of flight termination and control functions from the MFCO console, or functions from the auto abort logic of the flight control computer. The CTC is controlled by four microprocessors and their support logic. Each of these processors performs specific functions to insure

no invalid commands are transmitted. Inputs to the CTC include auto abort functions generated by the metric data processing flight control computer (MDPS) and site status information. Outputs from the CTC include command messages to remote sites and status inputs to the MFCO and RTDC consoles (also see Section 1, par.. 1.2.2.6.4).

2.4.6.4.6 Computer/Display System

The flight control functions of the MFCC are supported by two computer systems. The dual Metric Data Processing Systems (MDPS) and the dual Range Safety Display Systems (RSDS) provide the MFCC with two complete independent range safety systems. The Acquisition Data System (ADS) provides acquisition data to all range control tracking systems. The MDPS receives several different types of radar and telemetry data. From this data, MDPS generates a multi-station and several single station solutions of present position and instantaneous impact predictions. The multi-station solutions provide the capability to identify and correct invalid inertial guidance data and provide a higher quality of data on which to make flight termination decisions. The multi-station capability provides auxiliary benefits of helping identify invalid sensor data. The RSDS provides the means by which real-time graphic and alphanumeric displays of vehicle performance metric data are presented to flight control personnel. These displays present not only the real-time vehicle information but background data including geography, nominal profiles, and debris contours. The various displays of vehicle performance are provided by RSDS and are selectable from the MFCO/RTDC/ADSC operating positions.

2.4.6.4.7 Skyscreen

Forward observers are individuals from within 30SW/SE as well as 30 RANS/DOO-C who have been trained and certified to perform this duty. The Back Az position is located uprange from the launch point along the flight azimuth and the Program position is located cross-range from the launch point. The forward observer and TV may or may not be collocated. Skyscreen operators provided by ROMSSC set up and check out the Skyscreen systems prior to T-60 minutes, and operate the Skyscreen TV and communication systems.

Forward observers are individuals who have been certified by 30 SW/SEO to perform this duty. They are personnel from the SEO Section or occasionally, personnel from the SEY Section. Both Back Azimuth and Program observers report visual indications on the early phases of missile flight directly to the MFCO. Also, the Back Az observer uses two vertical, parallel wires aligned in a plane parallel to the flight trajectory plane. This Vertical Wire Skyscreen (VWSS) assists the Back Az observer in determining launch vehicle deviations from the normal flight azimuth. The VWSS is set up and

aligned to within two degrees of the launch azimuth by the skyscreen operator.

The Skyscreen TV consists of a portable TV camera system, support van, and microwave equipment, and provides real-time television coverage of vehicle performance to the MFCO. The Program TV camera is aligned with the cursor slightly on the downrange side of the launch vehicle and the Back Az TV is aligned with the cursor slightly offset from the launch vehicle so that it does not obstruct the view of the launch vehicle. After liftoff, the camera operator centers the launch vehicle in the frame after it approaches the upper boundary of the screen and maintains track until visual contact is lost.

2.4.6.5 Central Command System

The Central Command System (CCS) provides the MFCO with the capability to terminate launch vehicle flight if flight termination criteria are violated or mission rules call for MFCO action. CCS requirements are as follows:

- Ultra high frequency (UHF) transmission capability for flight termination commands is required throughout powered flight or until orbital insertion as dictated by the mission flown;
- Flight control command functions, including the capability to override, takes precedence over other commands that may be transmitted to or by command transmitter system sites;
- The command control transmitter field intensity along the nominal trajectory must show a 12 dB margin when subjected to a RF link analysis;
- Each command control transmitter supporting a launch must have a backup transmitter capable of maintaining the proper signal strength;
 - The backup transmitter must be activated by an automatic station guardian (failure sensing and failover switching) if the primary transmitter output falls to 50 percent of normal in an unplanned manner;
 - A pair of transmitters at a command control site, each connected to the station guardian, constitutes a system.
- When the launch vehicle airborne FTSs are active and ordnance is electrically connected, a command system must be radiating at the proper frequency to “capture” the receivers;
- During those periods when the FTS receiver is on, no UHF commands will be radiated in support of another operation unless there is at least a 4 MHz frequency separation.

The configuration of the command transmitter system may vary from launch to launch. The CMD determines the required configuration from the mission documentation and from instructions received from the MFCO. He ensures that all assigned command transmitter sites and telemetry monitoring stations are briefed on the required configuration and support.

The CMD sets up and checks out the command transmitter network, performs readiness checks, open loop checks, and the real-time phase in accordance with current operational procedures and specified Operation Directives (OD's). The supporting frequency monitoring sites set up, check out, and operate the monitoring equipment in accordance with current site operational procedures.

In its' current configuration the CCS is capable of supporting high-alphabet receivers.

2.4.6.6 Central Control Processing System

The Central Control Processing System (CCPS) is a multiple microprocessor-based system designed to provide operational support with at least one system failure. Its primary purpose is to communicate with the command transmitter (CT) sites (see Section 1, par.. 1.2.2.1). CCPS is being phased out, with the Console Control System (CCS) taking over it's function.

2.4.6.7 Launch Operations

Preflight, countdown, and inflight launch vehicle operations are as follows.

2.4.6.7.1 Preflight Operations

During preflight operations, checkout of the command control system is completed by L-45 minutes. When these checks are completed, the Range Control Officer (RCO) confirms to the MFCO that the ground portion of the flight termination system is fully mission capable. The MFCO then assumes full control of all command control systems. After the MFCO assumes control of the systems, the Flight Safety Project Officer (FSPO) will not allow the flight termination receivers to be turned on or off, and the RCO will not allow functions to be transmitted, without the specific approval of the MFCO. In case of misfire, hangfire, or mission scrubs, the receivers are turned off in accordance with the appropriate checklist.

The MFCO will not authorize launch until the FSPO confirms that the flight termination system is functioning properly. Proper operation of the flight termination system, as verified to and confirmed by the FSPO, includes the following:

- The command control system supporting the launch is checked out and is fully operational;

- The airborne flight termination system is checked out and is fully operational;
- All displays associated with the flight termination system and command control system are functioning properly at the MFCO console positions.

The Operations Safety Manager (OSM) and/or the Operations Safety Technician (OST) are responsible for the following preflight action item requirements.

- At the time specified in the countdown/pre-count, the OSMs must be on station at the Operations Safety Console in the blockhouse/Launch Control Center and at the launch area;
- The OSM controls all warning devices provided to indicate caution and danger periods;
- The OSM declares caution and danger periods at the times such action becomes necessary in the interest of safety;
- At a mutually agreed upon point in the countdown, the OSM sends a green light signal to the MFCO to indicate that the Flight Caution Area is clear;
- The OSM initiates a stop when safety constraints or emergency situations dictate.

In addition, the Launch Support Team (LST) controls access to all land-based hazardous areas during the countdown. Area status is reported to the MFCO by the LST team chief.

2.4.6.7.2 Countdown Operations

Three separate documents are published to govern launch and dress rehearsal activities - Launch Countdown, Phase 1, details the work required, step-by-step, to prepare the vehicle from the start of the countdown at T-25.5 hours (exact time may be vehicle dependant), to the final 'pad clear' at about T-4 hours. Launch Countdown, Phase 2, is the steps to be performed from the launch van, or by the range for the final hours of countdown through launch. The Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) is employed throughout the countdown to identify the allowable criteria limitations for weather, launch vehicle, or spacecraft systems. All three documents are coordinated with, reviewed by, and approved by spacecraft and launch vehicle engineering, vehicle operations, range operations, and Range Safety.

The personnel most involved in decision making during launch countdown include the following (NOTE: EWR 127-1 requires all personnel who accomplish pre-launch functions that require a high degree of concentration to have at least eight hours rest before a maximum 12 hour shift):

Range Personnel:

- Senior Mission Flight Control Officer (SMFCO);
- Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO);
- Telemetry Observer (TMO)
- Range Operations Commander (ROC);
- Range Control Officer (RCO);
- Launch Weather Officer (LWO);
- Flight Safety Project Officer (FSPO);
- Operations Safety Manager (OSM).

Commercial Launch Operator Personnel:

- Operator Launch Director (LD);
- Assistant Launch Director (ALD);

Payload Personnel:

- Payload Operator (PLO).

The responsibilities of each during countdown operations are as follows:

SMFCO - The SMFCO is directly responsible to the 30 SW Commander for the safe conduct of a launch during countdown and flight operations. He manages the mission flight control team during launch phase operations, maintains an overall view of range safety and vehicle pre-launch status, and directs the MFCO in critical safety decisions including countdown holds and flight termination.

MFCO - The MFCO is the safety focal point during all vehicle flight operations. He is responsible for controlling and coordinating the missile flight control portion of the countdown, and directs the actions of the mission flight control team. He is also responsible for making an overall launch hazard assessment, ensuring the range is clear of any traffic (i.e., trains, boats, planes, people); interfacing with the operations controller of the railroad monitor systems, ship radar, and airplane radar. He determines safety readiness to support the launch, monitors checkout procedures on the flight termination system, and conducts destruct systems tests. With the SMFCOs concurrence, he provides the safety readiness GO/NO-GO (final

clear to launch) decision to the ROC. During the launch the MFCO makes real time flight termination decisions.

ROC - The ROC is the senior range representative for launch operations. The ROC serves as the interface between the launch agency and the range, and manages, directs, and controls range resources to ensure all range instrumentation is capable and ready to support launch operations. He is responsible for range support during the generation and launch phase of operations, including range instrumentation support, contingency support requirements, aircraft/seacraft support, and support by off-range assets. He certifies range readiness and provides the launching agency the final overall range GO/NO-GO recommendation.

RCO - The RCO is responsible for the management of all operational range instrumentation. He directs all range system interfaces with commercial launch operator systems and coordinates with range system controllers to ensure mission capable support during range operations. He reports status and GO/NO-GO recommendations to the ROC.

FSPO - The FSPO is responsible for all flight safety hardware on the launch vehicles. This includes the command destruct, automatic destruct and tracking systems. ration of the FTS. The FSPO's launch countdown responsibilities include reviewing final systems test data, resolving real-time anomalies and certifying that airborne safety systems are GO for launch. The FSPO resides at a console position at the Range Users control facility and has access to FTS and tracking data. The FSPO provides the status of the airborne safety system to the MFCO. An FSPO also sits at the Range Safety Telemetry System (RSTS) When the MFCO gives a safety "GO", it should be assumed by the Range User that the FSPO has given his GO.

In addition, the FSPO is responsible for pre-launch activities that ensure the reliability of the airborne safety system. These efforts include airborne hardware develop, design, test and failure resolution.

OSM - The OSM is responsible for site safety at the launch complex and reports site status as appropriate. OSM's have the ability to control site aural/visual warning devices and pad video. The OSM assures that the pad is clear for launch via video monitors and is assisted by the Operations Safety Technician who participates and monitors the vehicle arming operations. The OSM is responsible for all safety aspects of the launch complex, including pad clearing and re-entry.

TMO - The Telemetry Observer sits at the MFCC stripchartsl. He observes the analog display channels, and telemetry data. Specific telemetry displays observed include vehicle chamber pressure, roll, pitch, and yaw, and FTS

status. . TMO's are individuals from within 30SW/SE as well as MFCO's from 30 RANS/DOO-C who have been trained and certified to perform this duty.

LWO - The LWO is responsible for providing the latest weather information to the launch team. He is available for weather briefings at any time during countdown.

LD - The LD is the range user's single point-of-command authority overseeing the launch team functions and responsibilities. He has the authority to stop the countdown at any point in the process, and is responsible for issuing final launch authorization. He ensures overall control of the countdown, maintains team discipline, and provides coordinating direction to the launch team during emergencies/contingencies, scrubs/recycles, and post-launch activities. Has final signature approval of all changes to the launch countdown procedure. He has authority over all testing activities, and works with Range Safety and the commercial launch operator system safety engineer to ensure safety during launch/test activities.

ALD - The ALD assists the LD in coordinating the activities in the Launch Control Center during launch countdown. He is capable of performing the functions and responsibilities of the LD should the need arise.

PLD1 - PLD1 is the payload manager who monitors the payload telemetry prior to launch to ensure the payload is ready to launch. He must rely on upper management and the Customer (either payload or commercial launch operator) for decision to approve readiness of the payload. Once approval is received, a GO/NO-GO decision is relayed to the LD.

PLD2 - PLD2 is the assistant payload manager.

During terminal countdown, there are really only two decision makers, the MFCO and the LD. The Launch Control Center contains the essential personnel to support the LD in his decision making process from the vehicle point of view (including the payload) and does not have to rely on any other management direction. The MFCO, with the support of the FSPO and OSM, will enable the flight termination system and give the GO/NO-GO decision to the RCO to pass to the LD when all sites have reported as ready, based on the range criteria being met for a safe launch. It is then the responsibility of the LD to initiate launch.

After T-0, however, the responsibility shifts solely to the MFCO who is tracking the vehicle to determine the vehicle flight path with respect to range

limit lines, which are predetermined and specific to the vehicle's accelerations. He has the sole responsibility to terminate flight if flight safety criteria are violated.

To ensure constant communication between the MFCO and the LD, the following means of contact are normally in place:

- Voice Direct Lines (VDL), a primary and backup;
- Countdown Net (C/D), a primary and backup;
- Status and Alert Lights installed at the consoles to indicate the GO/NO GO decisions that have been made.

After launch, the range user plays no role in the flight other than having the ability to observe telemetry data. Non-Safety personnel are not linked to the safety net in order to eliminate any potential distractions that may occur during dialogue between safety personnel as they monitor the vehicle.

2.4.6.7.3 Inflight Operations

The MFCO exercises operational control of the launch vehicle throughout powered flight using flight radar data (skin track and transponder augmented track), flight vehicle guidance TLM data, long range optics video, and ground observation data (back azimuth and program positions), to determine the vehicle flight path with respect to impact limit lines.

After vehicle ignition, the MFCO receives an "ignition" and "lift-off" call from the Forward Observers, Program and Back Azimuth, followed by a status report from the Telemetry Observer. The Instantaneous Impact Predictor and the Real-Time Debris Footprints are the first display items to generate history and appear to move. All MFCO support position operators report on a common voice net with a continuing dialogue as flight proceeds downrange and display information is continually updated. The Forward Observers report any abnormalities and staging events, if observed. The TM reports vehicle performance and could report events as displayed on the Range Safety Telemetry Display System. Any malfunctions or trajectory divergences observed by the MFCO will be confirmed by the Senior MFCO.

The TST CMD monitors command transmitter switching for the flight termination system as the vehicle proceeds downrange. The CMD interfaces directly with the MFCO, and ensures that the MFCO has the capability to send flight termination command signals if required. He also ensures that the required carrier and check channel are being transmitted.

The current command control system is switched at preselected times; the switch being made manually by the CMD. The switching times are published

in the RSOR. Indicators on the MFCO and CTC consoles show which command transmitter is radiating. Normally, site CT-1, CT-2, or CT-3 is used initially with a switch to site CT-6 being made for commercial polar launch orbits at approximately 50 seconds. CT-6 should not radiate while the local transmitter is radiating, therefore, there is a small time delay associated with the command switch. During this time delay, the airborne receivers are not captured by any WR command transmitters. The Automatic Gain Control (AGC) level of the airborne receivers is used as the primary parameter for confirming transmitter switching. After the switch, the MFCO confirms from TM that the AGCs are operating properly. If AGCs are not satisfactory, then a switch to another command transmitter site may be called for. While the RSOR calls for a certain switch time, the MFCO can, and will, call for any site throughout the flight profile. Experience dictates that vehicle exhaust plume attenuation begins at the local sites at about the published switch times.

MFCO operations at the WR use only one set of FTS switches for all launch support. If a problem exists at the MFCO console, the procedure is to bring up a redundant standby system or use the direct contact with the site to have the functions sent by the site operator. The capability to use dual switches for all launch vehicles is being engineered at the present time.

2.4.7 Personnel Training and Certification

This section addresses the training and certification of personnel who are critical to the Range Safety function.

2.4.7.1 Mission Flight Control Officer

The Mission Flight Control Officer's (MFCO's) are members of either the Mission Flight Control section of the 30SW Safety office or of the Charlie Operation flight of the 30 Range Squadron. However, during launch operations, the MFCO is the official representative of the Wing Commander and is responsible for taking all reasonable precautions to minimize the risk to life and property during launch vehicle flight.

Initially, each potential MFCO undergoes supervised training and checkout in assigned flight control launch support positions. These positions include Forward Observer and Telemetry. The trainee observes, participates, and is formally checked out in each position during actual launches. In addition, he is trained as a primary MFCO in simulated launch exercises where failures in instrumentation and communications are simulated. These exercises are not only designed to familiarize the trainee with potential problems and solutions, but are also used to gauge his judgment, reaction time, and stability under stress.

The trainee becomes familiar with the range, its instrumentation, facilities, and personnel through conducted tours and briefings. He is assigned a program and becomes familiar with all aspects of its functions, systems, and operational characteristics. The trainee is also assigned an alternate program and replaces the primary MFCO for that program when necessary.

The trainee is certified as a MFCO only after satisfactorily completing all initial phases of the training program, which includes 4 to 6 real world launch operations, as well as a final evaluation and a certification briefing. The MFCO continues to increase in experience and knowledge by assisting other primary MFCOs during their launches and training exercises, and by undergoing recurring MFCO training as necessary.

2.4.7.2 Senior MFCO Training

The Senior MFCO (SMFCO) training phase begins when the MFCO has achieved the prerequisites and demonstrated the skills specified above, and has normally been a certified MFCO for at least one year. Additionally, the MFCO must be certified on a minimum of one ballistic and one space vehicle. MFCOs must show a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each instrumentation system. They must recognize the inter-relationship between sensors and know what combinations for particular missiles constitute acceptable/unacceptable flight safety support. SMFCO's undergo process of training, evaluation and certification in the same fashion as is accomplished for a MFCO trainee. After successfully completing an oral examination given by the TO and the Chief of Safety, the SMFCO trainee may be recommended for certification by the 30 SW Commander.

2.4.7.3 Flight Safety Analyst

The Flight Analysis Section (SEY) training requirements for a new Flight Safety Analyst (FSA) are general in nature and cover a broad range of various disciplines involved in flight safety. New flight analysts coming into the Flight Analysis Section are subject to a formal training program. All personnel are degreed engineers, mathematicians or scientific analysts. On-the-job training is the primary method used for flight analysis personnel. The trainee is assigned to a support role for space launch vehicle programs and receives guidance and instructions from a senior analyst who reviews and approves the trainee's work. The trainee performs analyses of vehicle performance, failure modes, spent stage impact debris, impact limit lines, destruct lines, and many other safety-related issues. These analyses help to assure that the proposed space vehicle missions are being conducted in a manner consistent with flight safety criteria.

- Training Timetable - The length of time required to complete the Flight Safety Analyst training varies, depending on the trainee's capabilities and previous experience as well as the launch schedule and availability of training

supervisors. However, approximately one year is required for the trainee to complete the program and become fully qualified;

- Certification - The certification process for FSAs concludes with the trainee's designation as Senior FSA. The FSA trainee must demonstrate to SEY management the knowledge and skills sufficient to conduct flight safety support of a launch, as well as complete the specified training requirements prior to being certified.

2.4.7.4 System Safety Training

All personnel in the Systems Safety Section (SES) are subject to training requirements dictated by their position descriptions. Training is accomplished in a variety of different ways, ranging from individual self-study courses and technical seminars and symposiums to diverse college level courses presented by many universities and colleges across the country. Section resources play a significant role in the overall training program.

The initial training phase covers approximately one year for a safety engineer entering at the GS-07 level. Training is provided by designated subject matter specialists (within or outside of the System Safety Section) or at government training facilities. The trainee is required to attend and satisfactorily complete formal academic programs at the undergraduate and/or graduate level. One such program is the System Safety Course offered by the University of Southern California. On-the-job training is also a very important part of the training process. The trainee is exposed to areas that include the following: pad safety, facilities, governing safety directives, explosives safety, flight termination systems, nuclear safety, solid/liquid propellants, toxic hazards, hypergolics, launch vehicles, downrange stations, industrial safety, ground safety, and payload safety.

2.4.7.5 Flight Safety Project Officer

The Flight Safety Project Officer's (FSPO's) are assigned to the Engineering Support Section of the 30th Space Wing Safety Office and are usually civil service employees at the GS-13 level. They are responsible for the airborne safety system from concept definition, development, test and operational support. The FSPO training and certification program, for each employee, is formally documented in the FSPO training manual. The objective is to provide personnel who can certify systems which can meet stringent reliability requirements. There are three types of formal FSPO certifications:

- Program Manager Certification;
- Operations Certification;
- Recurring and proficiency training.

Program Manager Certification: This Certification enables the FSPO to work all aspects of airborne safety system design, development, test and anomaly resolution which lead up to launch. Each trainee obtains individual areas of expertise and when certified in a technical specialty, can work that technology on any program. Each FSPO is assigned a minimum of three programs, for which he/she is responsible. A FSPO may utilize the expertise of another FSPO who is certified in a specific technology. Each individual is expected to ensure public safety reliability requirements are met while minimizing cost and schedule impacts to the Range Users.

Operational Certification: Each FSPO first receives a generic operational certification. This requires the FSPO to work a variety of programs and successfully support these programs with no senior FSPO intervention. Typically, 10 launches are used to develop the generic operational certification. Certification for individual programs is achieved by autonomously supporting two launches of that vehicle type. During these certification operations, a certified FSPO will be in attendance to back-up the trainee should assistance be necessary. Following successful completion of all prerequisites, the trainee receives a certification that is documented in the FSPO training manual.

Recurring and proficiency training: The FSPO who was assigned during the design, testing, and integration of a new-to-the-range system is the defacto certified FSPO for that system. Recurring and proficiency training is continuous for all personnel. Each individual is expected to exercise maximum initiative to complete training items in the minimum time, consistent with launch opportunities and training priorities as established by the SEO and SES Sections.

2.4.7.6 Other Training

In addition to the above training requirements, there are a number of other critical areas that also must meet stringent training criteria.

2.4.7.6.1 The Operations Safety Manager (OSM)

The OSM must undergo a rigid training program. He is the FCO's on-scene representative, verifying that all aspects of the destruct system tasks have been done in accordance with approved procedures. Similar training/certification requirements exist for instrumentation operators, radar personnel, the command destruct transmitter technicians, and a number of others.

2.4.7.6.2 Console Controllers

The Missile Flight Control Center contains the following control consoles: MFCO, Real-Time Data Controller (RTDC), Acquisition Data System (ADS),

and Command Transmitter Controller (CMD). Except for the MFCO console, these consoles are manned by the ROMSSC controllers who are required to complete a four phase training program.

- Phase I is familiarization - This includes preparation of Level III documentation in the UDS format, training on range procedures, and range facility orientation. Mission support begins in Phase II;
- Phase II - A minimum of five non-flight operations or simulations are used to show what is done and to give the employee his first experience in conducting an operation. All support is done under the direct supervision of a certified controller. Phase II continues until the employee, trainer, and supervisor agree that he is ready for Phase III, flight support;
- Phase III - Normally, during this phase, several missions are worked. The first one is observed and then the countdown is performed by the trainee on the next mission. The trainee must satisfactorily support additional operations under the direct observation of a trainer before he is certified. Once certified, the employee is assigned to console positions on his own;
- Phase IV - Training does not end with certification. Periodic site orientation visits continue as do recurring evaluations. Action is initiated as required to ensure that all of the controllers remain qualified and current on active programs, procedures and range capabilities.

The time required for full certification varies depending on the position, frequency of launch operations, and the WR range experience of the individual. Past experience has shown that the certification process requires from three months to over a year.

2.4.8 Commercial Launch Operator Responsibilities and Requirements

The commercial launch operators have the responsibility to provide systems, equipment, and facilities and to conduct their operations in a safe manner that complies with and implements those portions of the WR safety program that are applicable to their mission. This is accomplished by joint Range Safety/commercial launch operator review and approval of components, systems, and subsystems at design reviews; the approval of hazardous operations and their associated operational procedures; the acceptance and qualification tests for critical systems, such as the FTS; the review and approval of quantity-distance siting for all support facilities and launch complexes; and the data required for flight plan approval.

In addition, the commercial launch operator is responsible for :

- Identification of Data Requirements. The commercial launch operator must identify data requirements in terms of precision, quality, format, quantity, and time and method of delivery;

- **Radio Frequency Compatibility Tests.** New commercial launch operator airborne instrumentation systems requiring WR data acquisition and processing must undergo radio frequency (RF) compatibility testing with the appropriate range acquisition system prior to flight;
- **Mandatory Data Requirements.** The commercial launch operator must identify data requirements as to “mandatory” (NO-GO), “required” or “desired”. In the event the requirements are mandatory, the 30 RANS will attempt to provide a backup source of instrumentation for data collection.

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